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Vision seems to occur effortlessly and without mistakes. As a result, it is easy to lose sight 
of the complex representational mechanisms going on under the hood. In macaque monkeys, the 
brain region thought to be the ultimate mediator of object recognition is the inferotemporal cortex 
(IT). The purpose of this dissertation was to investigate how IT neurons respond to parts of a 
display. We used two different paradigms that disrupt the perception of object parts to query how 
different parts of a visual scene interact. 
The first project was concerned with the behavioral phenomenon known as crowding, in 
which clutter causes peripheral objects to devolve into an unintelligible jumble. We are the first to 
develop a task conducive to concurrent behavior and neuronal recordings in monkeys. To 
demonstrate the relevance of our task, we turned to a hallmark of crowding: that what matters is 
the eccentricity and spacing between objects, not object size. Having demonstrated this, we were 
set to proceed to neuronal recordings. 
Our primary question was whether crowding quantitatively reduced the strength of IT 
neuronal selectivity or alternatively whether crowding induced a qualitative change to the neuronal 
code. Our results support the latter hypothesis. We then asked additional follow-up questions 
regarding size-sensitivity and adjacency of part-part interactions. Overall, our results were 
incompatible with a pooling model of crowding and consistent with models based on attention, 
texture, or source confusion. 
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The final experiment was concerned with whether certain parts of compound objects were 
preferentially represented over others. To do this we recorded IT spiking activity while monkeys 
viewed composite shapes made up of overlapping outlines, as well as all the possible constituent 
closed parts created by the overlap. Humans tend to only perceive the simpler shapes originally 
used to create the composite, but the same was not true of IT neurons. Instead, they represented 
the composite more like its external contour than any other part, especially in the initial phase of 
the response.  
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1.0  GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
We spend every waking moment perceiving objects in the world around us. This process 
occurs so effortlessly that it is easy to forget what a challenging task object recognition poses for 
the brain. A central problem of visual perception is how the brain interprets two-dimensional 
patterns of light as belonging to three-dimensional objects. In order to interpret these shapes 
appropriately, they must first be grouped properly. But how does the brain know which features 
belong to which objects?  
The goal of this introductory chapter is to briefly review the current state of our knowledge 
of the neuronal mechanisms underlying object recognition. The focus will primarily be on the 
visual system of the macaque monkey, with the aim of highlighting some critical gaps in our 
current understanding. This chapter will conclude by identifying a set of specific experimental 
aims that address these gaps. Chapter 2 will lay out the results of a series of experiments designed 
to investigate whether macaque monkeys experience the phenomenon of crowding in peripheral 
vision. Chapter 3 will include the results of a set of experiments designed to investigate the 
neuronal basis of crowding. Chapter 4 will present the results of an experiment designed to 
investigate how overlapping shapes are segregated and interpreted by the brain. Finally, chapter 5 
will conclude by discussing how the results of experiments have furthered our understanding of 
the neuronal mechanisms of object recognition.  
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1.1 AGNOSIA AND GESTALT  
Patients with apperceptive agnosia are not blind, but they lack the ability to make sense of 
the global organization of an object. Acuity, color vision, depth perception, and motion perception 
are all perfectly normal (Farah, 2004). However, when they are asked to reproduce drawings of 
complex objects the process is laborious and the result is an unintelligible jumble.  
In the 1970s, a 73-year-old artist was rendered agnosic after a stroke. The patient was 
unable to recognize faces and about 75% of the objects presented to him. When drawing these 
unnamable objects, he tended to focus on the details instead of the global organization, and he 
often lost his place. As a result, his drawings contained some of the same features as the original 
image, but they were disjointed and disproportional (Fig. 1). Interestingly, despite his stroke, his 
drawings retained the same style as before. He maintained his techniques of perspective, 
shadowing, and texture, suggesting that all he lost was the capacity to meld object parts into a 
cohesive whole (Wapner et al., 1978).  
This notion of a cohesive whole visual percept dates 
all the way back to the Gestalt psychologists, based in the 
Berlin School of Experimental Psychology around the turn 
of the 20th century. Among this clan was Kurt Koffka, who 
famously said, “The whole is other than the sum of the 
parts,” (Koffka, 1935). What he meant by this statement is 
that the whole, or the gestalt, of a visual object has an 
existence in the perceptual system independent of its parts. 
The simple presence of the parts does not define the whole. 
Figure 1. Airplane drawing by an artist with 
apperceptive agnosia attempting to copy from 
the photograph below. (Reprinted with 
permission from Cortex, Wapner et al. 
(1978), Fig. 6).  
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Rather, those parts must cohere in a specific way to create a meaningful whole. 
Driven largely by introspection, the Gestaltists worked out a set of laws of perceptual 
organization. At the heart of these laws is the Law of Prägnanz, which is a German word meaning 
goodness of form (Metzger, 1936). This law commands that the environment is perceived in the 
simplest way possible. For instance, if two lines cross it is much more parsimonious to view them 
as both continuing on their original trajectories after the point of intersection rather than suddenly 
jibing to take up the other’s course. This particular example is also known as the Law of 
Continuity.  
Although simple observation lends credence to the Gestalt laws, evidence for an underlying 
mechanism is scant (Lee and Nguyen, 2001; Sáry et al., 2007). One of the aims of this project is 
to look for a neuronal basis for the Law of Prägnanz by recording from neurons in the area of the 
macaque monkey brain thought to encode subjective visual experience (Sheinberg and Logothetis, 
1997). 
1.2 BRAIN STRUCTURES FOR OBJECT REPRESENTATION 
Wapner’s agnosic artist acquired his injury from a blockage in his posterior cerebral artery 
(1978). This artery supplies blood to the occipital cortex and the ventral portion of the temporal 
lobe (Gray, 1918). Brain imaging of another famous apperceptive agnosic, patient DF, revealed 
that her lesion bilaterally affected a brain structure called lateral occipital cortex (LOC; James et 
al., 2003). Area LOC (Fig. 2A) is functionally defined in healthy subjects as being more active 
when viewing whole objects compared to viewing scrambled versions of those same objects (Grill-
Spector et al., 2001; James et al., 2003). Thus, LOC is defined as a region involved in holistic form 
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perception more so than the perception of local features. Just as in Wapner’s stroke patient, the 
neuronal basis of perceiving parts and wholes appears to be dissociable (1978). 
A homologous structure to human LOC in the macaque monkey is inferotemporal cortex 
(IT; Tsao et al., 2003). Just like LOC, IT (Fig. 2B) is more active when viewing whole objects 
versus viewing the scrambled parts of those objects (Desimone et al., 1984; Tsao et al., 2003; 
Vogels, 1999). IT lesions impair discrimination of complex visual objects (Cowey and Gross, 
1970; Ungerleider and Mishkin, 1982), and neurons in this region fire vigorously in response to 
complex visual stimuli (Desimone et al., 1984; Gross et al., 1972; Tanaka et al., 1991). These 
neurons are broadly tuned, responding in a graded fashion to a large number of stimuli (Rolls et 
al., 1994) that share features (Brincat and Connor, 2004) or fall into the same category (Freedman 
et al., 2003). This selectivity to object structure and identity is accompanied by the amazing 
invariance across identity-preserving manipulations (Dicarlo et al., 2012), such as size, position 
(Ito et al., 1995), and 3D viewpoint (Ratan Murty and Arun, 2015). 
IT receives most of its input from feed-forward projections along a massively convergent 
hierarchy of visual cortical areas (Felleman and Van Essen, 1991). Shape information is 
progressively refined as it travels up the ventral “what” stream (Fukushima, 1980; Riesenhuber 
Figure 2. Visual object representation in the brain. A, Lateral Occipital Cortex (LOC) in the human brain. B, Inferior 
Temporal Cortex (IT) in the macaque monkey brain.  
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and Poggio, 1999). The ideal stimulus at each successive stage becomes increasingly complex 
(Guclu and van Gerven, 2015). 
Starting at the very beginning of the process, light information travels from the retina to 
the lateral geniculate nucleus of the thalamus. The thalamus then sends projections to primary 
visual cortex (V1), which is the earliest cortical stage of shape processing in the ventral stream 
(Ungerleider and Mishkin, 1982). Neurons in V1 respond to luminance contrast at varying spatial 
frequency and orientation (Hubel and Wiesel, 1965). The primary purpose of this stage is to create 
a veridical representation of lines and edges. Lesions to this area produce a scotoma (Heinen and 
Skavenski, 1991; Koerner and Teuber, 1973; Miller et al., 1980).  
V1 then projects to area V2, which has slightly larger receptive fields (Kobatake and 
Tanaka, 1994), and responds to higher level features such as illusory contours (Lee and Nguyen, 
2001), border ownership (Zhou et al., 2000), and texture (Freeman et al., 2013). Thus, in V2 we 
already see a higher-order visual representation taking shape, rather than a compressed replication 
of the scene. Whereas V1 is necessary to detect low-level features such as line orientation, V2 is 
necessary for detecting lines defined by grouping and collinearity or texture (Merigan et al., 1993). 
The step from V2 to V4 results in even further abstraction and cognitive influence emerges. 
Receptive fields get larger still (Kobatake and Tanaka, 1994), and the effects of border ownership 
become both stronger and more common (Zhou et al., 2000). V4 is also where visual attention 
begins to exert strong effects (McAdams and J. Maunsell, 1999; Moran and Desimone, 1985; 
Motter, 1994). This area is necessary for focusing spatial attention to isolate one stimulus from 
distractors (De Weerd et al., 1999).  
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1.3 INFEROTEMPORAL CORTEX AS A WINDOW TO PERCEPTION 
One of the defining characteristics of IT neurons is that they have large receptive fields, 
averaging about 10° in diameter, always including the fovea, and centered in the contralateral 
hemifield (Gross et al., 1969; Op De Beeck and Vogels, 2000). When multiple objects are present 
in one of these expansive receptive fields, the neuron fires at a rate equivalent to the mean of the 
rate evoked by each object individually (Zoccolan et al., 2005). This phenomenon is called divisive 
normalization. Fortunately, attention rescues individual objects from divisive normalization by 
restoring the firing rate of the attended object (Chelazzi et al., 1998; Moran and Desimone, 1985; 
Zhang et al., 2011). This process may form the neuronal basis by which primates can make sense 
of cluttered scenes. In this way, IT neurons encode what the subject perceives, not merely what is 
presented to the eye.  
Another line of evidence linking IT to perceptual experience comes from the field of 
binocular rivalry. Binocular rivalry is an experimental paradigm in which each eye is presented 
with a different image. Under these conditions, the eyes compete and the winner takes all such that 
subjects report perceiving only one of the images at a time. Traveling up the neuronal hierarchy 
from primary visual cortex to IT, spiking activity becomes progressively more correlated with the 
subject’s perceptual report (Leopold and Logothetis, 1996; Sheinberg and Logothetis, 1997). In a 
more naturalistic setting in which monkeys freely searched for target objects in natural scenes, IT 
neurons only responded to their preferred stimulus if it was actually noticed (Sheinberg and 
Logothetis, 2001). When playing tricks on the monkey by changing the target image mid-trial, IT 
neuronal firing predicted whether the animal would choose the initial target or the new target as 
well as the timing of this decision (Mruczek and Sheinberg, 2007).  
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1.4 CROWDING 
What happens in IT when the perception of objects goes awry? To approach this question, 
we turned to a well-studied phenomenon, known as crowding, that in healthy humans looks a lot 
like agnosia (Strappini et al., 2017). In peripheral vision individual features are detectable and 
discriminable, but their locations in space seem to become unglued, creating a jumbled percept 
(Lettvin, 1976).   
The first investigations into crowding involved showing subjects arrays of letters at varying 
eccentricities and with varying space between them (Bouma, 1970). As long as letters were above 
the acuity level for the subject they were perfectly legible when presented alone (Fig. 3). When 
placed in close proximity, however, the letters interfered with each other such that subjects could 
no longer read any of them individually. Thus, crowding is not a failure of acuity, but a failure to 
segregate objects. Bouma also found that the distance between letters that gave rise to crowding 
was proportional to the eccentricity of the whole array (1970), which became known as Bouma’s 
Law (Pelli and Tillman, 2008). Although Bouma discovered this law using letters, it has since been 
demonstrated to generalize to other types of feature classes, including orientation, hue, saturation, 
and size (van den Berg et al., 2007), and even the features within a face (Pelli and Tillman, 2008). 
As long as features are similar  (Kooi et al., 1994), they can crowd one another. Unfortunately, 
that’s where the data stops being neat and tidy. 
Despite great effort across a great many labs, the ensuing decades proved crowding to be 
“an enigma wrapped in a paradox and shrouded in a conundrum” (Levi, 2008). It does not appear 
to arise from surround suppression (Petrov et al., 2007). Crowding may (He et al., 1996) or may 
not (Freeman and E. P. Simoncelli, 2011) represent a limit on the peripheral resolution of spatial 
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attention. Crowding appears to match a 
representation based on pooled summary statistics 
(Balas et al., 2009), which correspond to the 
information encoded in mid-level visual areas 
(Freeman et al., 2013) pooled over those neurons’ 
receptive fields (Freeman and E. P. Simoncelli, 
2011). Yet this explanation cannot capture the 
striking anisotropy of the fields over which 
peripheral features are pooled (Toet and Levi, 
1992). First and foremost, it’s not clear how the 
neuronal code gets corrupted to give rise to crowding. Answering this question requires recording 
from visual neurons while subjects view crowded and uncrowded displays, and that approach 
forms the basis for the first major thrust of this dissertation.  
1.5 DO MONKEYS BEHAVE AS IF THEIR VISION IS CROWDED? 
In the decades of crowding research, humans have been used exclusively. The macaque 
monkey provides an attractive model for studying the neuronal mechanisms behind crowding, but 
without having first established that they experience visual crowding it is not clear whether any 
insights from the monkey would generalize across species.  The aim of the experiments described 
in chapter 2 will be to explicitly test whether rhesus macaques exhibit the behavioral hallmarks of 
crowded peripheral vision. A positive result establishes a monkey-friendly task that can be used to 
investigate how crowding arises in the brain at the level of single neurons. 
Figure 3. Crowding demonstration. On each line, 
fixate the black dot and try to read the letter X. Since 
the X is legible in isolation or with far away flankers, 
you clearly possess the necessary acuity for letters of 
this size and eccentricity. When flankers are nearby 
the X dissolves into a hodgepodge of features. 
However, If you fixate the X directly, it is clearly 
discriminable in all cases, demonstrating that 
crowding is specific to peripheral vision. 
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1.6 HOW DO IT NEURONS ENCODE CROWDED DISPLAYS? 
 It has been well established that IT neurons exhibit divisive normalization when multiple 
objects fall within their receptive field (Carandini and Heeger, 2011; Chelazzi et al., 1998; Sripati 
and Olson, 2010a; Zoccolan et al., 2005). Divisive normalization weakens the representation of 
simultaneously-presented stimuli by averaging together the responses to individual stimuli. When 
those stimuli are far apart, however, divisive normalization can be overcome by spatial attention 
(Chelazzi et al., 1998; J. Lee and J. H. Maunsell, 2009; Reynolds and Heeger, 2009). Critically, 
under a divisive normalization/attention framework, only the strength of the signal is altered, not 
its nature. 
Many psychologists who study crowding think that the underlying mechanism has to do 
with averaging (Greenwood et al., 2009; Harrison and Bex, 2015; Parkes et al., 2001), or that the 
spotlight of attention has minimum size limits such that nearby clutter may not be able to be 
excluded (Cavanagh et al., 1999). These hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. No prior studies 
have systematically investigated the connection between divisive normalization and crowding, nor 
have they had the temporal resolution to measure how attention relates to crowding. These are two 
of the hypothesis we plan to test in chapter 3. 
An alternative hypothesis about the neuronal basis of crowding states that rather than 
weakening object representations there is a qualitative change in how crowded objects are encoded 
(Chastain, 1982; Freeman et al., 2012; Strasburger and Malania, 2013). In these models of 
crowding, the qualitative change tends to take the form of substitution of distracter features for 
those of the target (Chastain, 1982; Krumhansl and Thomas, 1977; Wolford, 1975), or substituting 
a whole distractor for the target (Strasburger et al., 1991), or a mixture of the two (Freeman et al., 
2012). In any case, this account of crowding dictates that the neuronal code is not merely weakened 
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but qualitatively altered. Attention may be involved in this model as well (Strasburger, 2005), 
although there is no neuronal evidence to support this claim at the present time. In chapter 3 we 
will also examine whether a qualitative change in the IT neuronal code occurs as inter-object 
spacing decreases. If so we will attempt to characterize the nature of that change. 
1.7  ARE COMPOUND OBJECT PARTS SIMPLY SUMMED? 
While the previous section was concerned with the interferences between different shapes 
in peripheral vision, next we explore how the parts of foveal objects cohere into a meaningful 
whole. Are wholes represented as merely the sum of their parts? Or were the Gestaltists right in 
asserting that the whole is something altogether different (Koffka, 1935)? 
For IT neurons, when parts were spatially segregated to opposite poles of a baton, the whole 
was no more than the sum of its parts (Sripati and Olson, 2010a). However, when two overlapping 
shape outlines were presented, IT neurons exhibited response suppression compared to when the 
outline in the forefront was presented alone (Missal et al., 1999). An important caveat to this 
experiment is that since the researchers didn’t show the background shape alone it is not clear 
whether the reduction they observed was the result of divisive normalization (Zoccolan et al., 
2005) or some other process. They also did not investigate whether the new features created by 
the overlapping outlines played a role in shaping neuronal responses to the whole.  
The aim of the experiment described in chapter 4 will be to test whether IT neurons follow 
the Gestalt law of simplicity by decomposing overlapping shape outlines into the parts that seem 
most natural, as humans tend to do (Metzger, 1936; Pomerantz et al., 1977). An alternative 
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hypothesis is that IT neurons represent compound images as the sum (or average) of any complete 
set of parts.  
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2.0  MACAQUE MONKEYS EXPERIENCE VISUAL CROWDING 
In peripheral vision, objects easily discriminated on their own become less discriminable 
in the presence of surrounding clutter. This phenomenon is known as crowding. The neuronal 
mechanisms underlying crowding are not well understood. Better insight might come from single-
neuron recording in nonhuman primates, provided they exhibit crowding. However previous 
demonstrations of crowding have been confined to humans. In the present study, we set out to 
determine whether crowding occurs in rhesus macaque monkeys. We found that animals trained 
to identify a target letter among flankers displayed three hallmarks of crowding as established in 
humans. First, at a given eccentricity, increasing the spacing between the target and the flankers 
improved recognition accuracy.  Second, the critical spacing, defined as the minimal spacing at 
which target discrimination was reliable, was proportional to eccentricity. Third, the critical 
spacing was largely unaffected by object size. We conclude that monkeys, like humans, experience 
crowding. These findings open the door to studies of crowding at the neuronal level in the monkey 
visual system. 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In comparison to foveal vision, our view of the periphery is impoverished. This is due in 
part to the fact that there are fewer cones and fewer retinal ganglion cells dedicated to peripheral 
than to foveal locations (Wässle et al., 1989). Foveal overrepresentation persists as visual 
information flows through the thalamus to primary visual cortex where the amount of tissue 
devoted to a given eccentricity is directly proportional to acuity. Thus acuity is believed to decrease 
in the periphery as a direct result of coarser sampling by cones (Cowey and Rolls, 1974). 
Peripheral vision suffers not only from reduced acuity but also from information loss due 
to crowding. The essence of crowding is that a peripheral item recognizable on its own becomes 
illegible when surrounded by other nearby items. Crowding is usually quantified in terms of critical 
spacing, the maximum distance at which surrounding clutter interferes with object recognition. 
Critical spacing, like acuity, scales with eccentricity (Bouma, 1970). However, unlike acuity, 
critical spacing possesses no well-established neuronal explanation. Mechanisms that appear to 
have been ruled out include surround suppression (Petrov et al., 2007) and impaired feature 
detection (Levi et al., 2002a; Parkes et al., 2001; Pelli et al., 2004). Pooling of feature information 
within neuronal receptive fields remains, however, a plausible explanation (Flom et al., 1963b). 
The rate at which critical spacing scales with eccentricity in humans is explicable by pooling within 
windows roughly the size of neuronal receptive fields in area V2 of the monkey (Freeman and E. 
P. Simoncelli, 2011). Yet, pooling within V2 receptive fields cannot be the full explanation 
because these receptive fields lack the anisotropic structure required to account for radial-
tangential differences in critical spacing (Toet and Levi, 1992). Elliptical zones of integration 
might conceivably arise from a top-down selection process (He et al., 1996) tied to the saccadic 
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system, in which an anisotropy for precision mirrors the anisotropy for critical spacing (Harrison 
et al., 2013; Nandy and Tjan, 2012). 
To draw firm conclusions concerning the neuronal processes that underlie crowding will 
require studying the phenomenon by means of invasive techniques such as are typically employed 
in nonhuman primates. However, nonhuman primates will be appropriate for study only if they 
exhibit crowding. The aim of the present study was to determine whether they do. The universal 
hallmark of crowding is Bouma’s law, which in its most general form states that the critical spacing 
at which an object becomes unidentifiable among similar flankers depends solely on eccentricity, 
regardless of the nature of the object (Pelli and Tillman, 2008). It follows that critical spacing is 
independent of object size (Levi, 2008; Pelli et al., 2004). To determine whether monkeys exhibit 
crowding, we trained two macaques to perform a visual discrimination task in which we could 
vary the spacing, eccentricity and size of the target and the flanking distractors. We found that 
psychometric functions relating accuracy to target-flanker distance resembled those of humans, 
that critical spacing was proportional to eccentricity, and that critical spacing was largely 
unaffected by object size. We conclude that monkeys experience crowding. This observation paves 
the way for investigations into the neuronal mechanisms underlying crowding in awake, behaving 
monkeys. 
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2.2 METHODS 
2.2.1 Animals and Equipment 
Two adult male rhesus macaque monkeys (Macaca mulatta) were used in these 
experiments (monkey 1 and monkey 2). Experimental procedures were approved by the Carnegie 
Mellon University Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee and were in compliance with the 
United States Public Health Service Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals. 
For behavioral testing, each monkey was seated in a primate chair with the head stabilized 
by a surgically implanted post. Events during each trial were controlled by Cortex software 
(NIMH). Visual stimuli were presented on a 17” LCD screen with 1024 x 768 pixels of resolution 
positioned 18” from the animal’s eyes. Eye position was tracked by an infrared system (ISCAN). 
The system was calibrated by requiring the monkey, at the beginning of each block of trials, to 
fixate a small target presented successively at four locations corresponding to the corners of a 14° 
x 14° square centered on the screen. Offline, the readings on each trial were converted to degrees 
of visual angle by performing a linear transformation based on the stored calibration voltages. 
2.2.2 Task Design 
On each trial, the monkey responded to presentation of a target in the right visual field by 
making a saccade directly above or below fixation (Fig. 4A). The targets were Sloan letters A, F, 
H, U, and Z (courtesy of Denis Pelli) and counterparts obtained by rotating them 90°.  Each letter 
had an aspect ratio of one. A letter and its rotated counterpart were associated with saccades in  
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opposite directions according to rules counterbalanced across animals. The target-saccade 
mapping shown in Fig. 4B was used for monkey 1 and reversed for monkey 2. Flankers, when 
present, consisted of Sloan letters K, P, T, and Y. Their arrangement varied from trial to trial (Fig. 
4C). They were always of the same size as the target. We chose letters as stimuli because their use 
is common in human studies of crowding. The monkeys’ prior experience with letters was 
fundamentally different from the experience of human subjects. To allay concern that this might 
affect crowding, we collected data from two human subjects using identical displays as described 
in a later section.   
Within each block of trials, the size and eccentricity of the target were fixed. Size and 
eccentricity were manipulated across three experiments: Experiment 1 (size 1° at eccentricity 6°), 
Experiment 2 (size 0.5° at eccentricity 3°), and Experiment 3 (size 0.5° at eccentricity 6°). To 
characterize the effect of size and eccentricity on choice accuracy required cross-block 
Figure 4.  Task Description. A, Sequence of events during a typical trial. Dashed circle indicates the location of the 
animal’s gaze during each epoch. B, The full set of targets with their associated responses. The association of targets 
with “up” and “down” responses in monkey 1, as indicated here, was reversed for monkey 2. C, The flankers 
surrounding the target could appear in any of four configurations.  
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comparison. To minimize the influence of random fluctuations from block to block, each monkey 
completed twelve blocks of trials for each experiment. Each block required performing a 
discrimination under 192 different conditions as described next.   
Within each block, the variable of key interest was the center-to-center spacing between 
the target and the flankers. On a given trial, this could assume any of six values with equal 
likelihood. In a block involving the presentation of targets at an eccentricity of 6°, the possible 
spacings were 1.1°, 1.45°, 1.8°, 2.15°, 2.5° and infinity (target alone). In a block involving the 
presentation of targets at an eccentricity of 3°, the possible spacings were 0.6°, 0.8°, 1.0°, 1.2°, 
1.4° and infinity (target alone). Other incidental factors varying within a block were fully 
counterbalanced against spacing. These factors included target identity, saccade direction, 
placement of the target in the upper or lower visual field and flanker configuration. In each block, 
we employed as targets two letters and their rotated counterparts. The four targets appeared with 
equal frequency. Saccades in upward and downward directions were demanded with equal 
frequency because targets associated with the two directions were equally common. In each block, 
the target appeared equally often above and below the zero-degree horizontal meridian. In blocks 
involving the presentation of targets at 3° and 6° eccentricity, the vertical displacement from the 
horizontal meridian was 0.5° and 1°, respectively. The flankers could appear in any of four 
configurations (Fig. 4C). 
Full counterbalancing required assessing behavior under 192 conditions corresponding to 
all possible combinations of six spacings, four targets, two vertical locations and four flanker 
configurations. The conditions were imposed in random order with the sole exception that each 
combination of target, spacing and flanker occurred once in the first half of the block (when the 
display was centered at one vertical location) and again in the second half of the block (when the 
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display was centered at the other vertical 
location). The sequence of vertical locations 
was upper-then-lower for half of the target-
spacing-flanker combinations and lower-
then-upper for the other half. 
 During a single block, the monkey 
had to complete a trial successfully under 
each of the 192 conditions.  A trial was 
considered successful if the monkey made a 
saccade in the correct direction. This 
culminated in juice reward followed by an 
immediate advance to the next trial. A trial 
was aborted if the monkey’s gaze deviated by 
more than 2° horizontally or 3° vertically 
from the central fixation point. In practice, 
the gaze rarely deviated more than 1° 
horizontally or 2° vertically (Fig. 5). 
Breaking fixation or making an erroneous 
response resulted in withholding of reward 
and a time-out of several seconds. The 
condition was returned to the pool from 
which future trials would be drawn. We 
based behavioral analysis exclusively on 
Figure 5. Gaze Angle. For each monkey, during each trial, 
we measured the mean eye position during the period in 
which the letter array was on the screen. Each panel shows 
the grand mean and the horizontal and vertical standard 
deviations of the values obtained from one monkey in one 
experiment. Positive values on the vertical axis indicate 
displacement of gaze above the fixation point. Positive values 
on the horizontal axis indicate displacement of gaze toward 
the target. A, Experiment 1. B, Experiment 2. C, Experiment 
3.  
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those 192 trials in which the monkey made the first saccadic decision under a given condition 
without regard to whether the decision was correct or incorrect.  
2.2.3 Schedule of Training and Testing 
After training on basic skills such as maintaining gaze on a central fixation point and 
making a saccade to a suddenly appearing peripheral circle, the monkeys were introduced to a 
visual discrimination task in which a 1° target appearing at fixation instructed an upward or 
downward saccade. This phase took one month in monkey 1 and three months in monkey 2. Next, 
the monkeys were eased into performing the same discrimination on 1° targets presented at an 
eccentricity of 6°. This phase took one month in monkey 1 and three months in monkey 2. Next, 
they were habituated to performing in the presence of flanking distractors at various spacings by 
presenting the distractors at very low contrast initially and gradually increasing their contrast. This 
phase took one month in monkey 1 and four months in monkey 2. We continued to train the 
monkeys with flankers fully visible until their performance stabilized. This took four months in 
monkey 1 and two weeks in monkey 2. We then introduced them to task variants with 0.5° targets 
centered at an eccentricity of 3° or 6°. To achieve stable behavior under multiple interleaved 
conditions took two weeks in monkey 1 and six weeks in monkey 2. Finally, we collected 
behavioral data over the course of one month in each animal, interleaving blocks of trials with 0.5° 
objects at an eccentricity of 3°, 0.5° objects at an eccentricity of 6°, and 1° objects at an eccentricity 
of 6°. 
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2.2.4 Data Analysis 
The universal measure of crowding is critical spacing, the maximal spacing at which 
flankers seriously interfere with target discrimination (Bouma, 1970; Pelli and Tillman, 2008). 
Human studies typically adopt a definition of critical spacing based on a fixed threshold halfway 
between chance and perfect accuracy, taking the critical spacing to be that spacing at which a 
psychometric function fitted to the data intersects the threshold (Chung, 2007; Kooi et al., 1994; 
Toet and Levi, 1992). The use of a predefined threshold would be problematic in monkeys because 
their performance is more erratic than the performance of humans. Even under undemanding 
conditions, overall accuracy rarely approaches 100%. Furthermore, overall accuracy can be 
affected by minor changes in a task, including, in the present instance, alterations of target size 
and eccentricity and the addition of flankers. It is impossible, in such cases, to distinguish between 
a bottom-up cause (such as poor acuity) and a top-down cause (such as poor motivation or 
confusion in the face of difficulty). To circumvent this difficulty, we adopted the following 
approach. 
We defined threshold as the inflection point of a sigmoidal function fitted to points 
representing accuracy as a function of flanker spacing: 
 𝑷 𝒔 = 𝜷𝟏 + 𝜷𝟎(𝜷𝟏𝟏) 𝒔	𝒔𝒄	 𝜷𝟐     Eq. 1 
where P(s) is the probability of a correct response at a given spacing (s), β0 represents the lower 
asymptote, β1 is the upper asymptote, β2 determines the slope at the inflection point, and sC is the 
inflection point. Model parameters were fitted using nonlinear least-squares (provided in the 
MATLAB Curve-Fitting Toolbox). We operationally defined critical spacing as the model 
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coefficient sC.  This approach conforms in spirit to the practice in human studies of selecting a 
threshold midway between chance and perfect performance. 
Human studies often include data from trials in which flankers were absent in the set of 
data to which the psychometric curve is fitted (Levi et al., 2002b; Pelli et al., 2004). The inclusion 
of singleton data would be problematic in monkeys due to reasons noted above. Accordingly, we 
based our estimate of critical spacing exclusively on trials in which flankers were present. 
To be sure that the results obtained from monkeys were not an artifact of these choices 
with regard to the how critical spacing was measured, we repeated all analyses using two 
alternative models: a model in which β1 was fixed at the performance level when no flankers were 
present and a model in which β2 was fixed at the average slope across experiments. The essential 
findings were the same (Fig. 10). We also applied to human data the measurement procedure 
customized for use in monkeys. The essential findings were the same (Fig. 11). 
2.3 RESULTS 
Both animals were able to discriminate the target at a rate well above chance when the 
flankers were sufficiently far away. Both experienced a falloff in accuracy as the flankers moved 
closer to the target. To determine whether the pattern of falloff was consistent with expectations 
based on crowding, we assessed performance as a function of the eccentricity of the display and 
size of the letters within it.  
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2.3.1 Experiment 1 
We first assessed performance with displays consisting of 1° letters with the target at 6° 
eccentricity (Fig. 6A). These parameters are within the range commonly used to demonstrate 
crowding in humans (Chung, 2007; Levi et al., 2002b; Tripathy and Cavanagh, 2002). As in 
humans (Kooi et al., 1994; Tripathy and Cavanagh, 2002; Yeshurun and Rashal, 2010) accuracy 
Increased as a function of target-flanker spacing in a pattern well fit by a sigmoidal function (Fig. 
6C-D; goodness of fit: R2  = 1.0 in monkey 1 and 0.99 in monkey 2). That the fit was good is not 
surprising inasmuch as there were five data points and the model had four free parameters. The 
Figure 6.  Experiment 1. A, The target was placed at an eccentricity of 6° in the right visual field. Each target and 
flanker subtended 1°. B, Flankers were spaced at five center-to-center distances from the target. In a sixth condition, 
flankers were absent. C, Accuracy as a function of spacing in monkey 1. Each data point reflects the mean over all 
blocks. Error bars indicate the SEM across blocks. The red curve is fit to five points representing performance when 
flankers were present. The dashed red line indicates the critical spacing defined as the inflection point of the fitted 
curve. D, Equivalent psychometric data for monkey 2. 
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purpose of curve-fitting was to allow us to establish the inflection point of the best-fit curve, which 
serves as an operational measure of critical spacing (Methods).  
This measure possesses the virtue of being insensitive to asymptotic accuracy, which 
typically varies from monkey to monkey. Monkey 1 (Fig. 6C) was superior to monkey 2 (Fig. 6D) 
in asymptotic accuracy.  Nevertheless, the measured critical spacing was virtually identical in the 
two animals: 1.45° in monkey 1 and 1.47° in monkey 2.  
2.3.2 Experiment 2 
If the critical spacing, as measured above, genuinely arose from crowding, then, according 
to Bouma’s law (Bouma, 1970; Pelli and Tillman, 2008), it should decline with a reduction in 
eccentricity. To test this prediction, we scaled the display down by a factor of 0.5, reducing target 
eccentricity to 3° and letter size to 0.5° and contracting the range of target-flanker spacings 
proportionately. As in the first experiment, the data were well fit by a sigmoidal function (Fig. 7C-
D; goodness of fit: R2 = 0.99 in monkey 1 and 0.90 in monkey 2). The measured critical spacing 
was 0.82° in monkey 1 (diminished from experiment 1 by a factor of 0.57) and 0.90° in monkey 2 
(diminished from experiment 1 by a factor of 0.61). These values were close to the value of 0.5 
predicted from Bouma’s law.  
2.3.3 Experiment 3 
 The reduction in critical spacing from experiment 1 to experiment 2 might in principal have 
arisen either from scaling down the eccentricity of the display or from scaling down the size of the 
letters. However, classic accounts of crowding predict that critical spacing should be largely 
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independent of letter size (Levi et al., 2002b; Pelli et al., 2004; Tripathy and Cavanagh, 2002) 
unlike lateral masking, which should scale with size (Levi et al., 2002a; Pelli et al., 2004). To test 
this prediction, we presented the display at the original eccentricity of 6° while employing small 
letters (0.5°). The data were well fit by a sigmoidal function (Fig. 8C-D; goodness of fit: R2 = 0.93 
in monkey 1 and 0.90 in monkey 2). The critical spacing derived from the fitted curves was 1.42° 
in monkey 1 and 1.43° in monkey 2. These values were very close to values measured in 
experiment 1 with letters twice as large. This outcome is compatible with observations in humans 
viewing crowded displays. It is incompatible with an explanation based solely on lateral masking.  
Figure 7.  Experiment 2. A, The target was placed at an eccentricity of 3° in the right visual field. Each target and 
flanker subtended 0.5°. B, Flankers were spaced at five center-to-center distances from the target. In a sixth condition, 
flankers were absent. C, Accuracy as a function of spacing in monkey 1. Each data point reflects the mean over all 
blocks. Error bars indicate the SEM across blocks. The blue curve is fit to five points representing performance when 
flankers were present. The dashed blue line indicates the critical spacing defined as the inflection point of the fitted 
curve. The red curve is carried over from experiment 1 for comparison. D, Equivalent psychometric data for monkey 
2.  
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2.3.4 Comparison 
The results of experiments 1-3 are summarized in Fig. 9. From this figure, it is clear that 
the critical spacing depended primarily on eccentricity (6° in experiments 1 and 3 as compared to  
3° in experiment 2) and not on letter size (as indicated by the dashed white lines superimposed on 
the bars).  As a basis for statistical comparison among the outcomes of the three experiments, we 
computed critical spacing for each of the twelve blocks of trials completed by each monkey in 
each experiment. 
To determine whether eccentricity influenced the critical spacing with size held constant, 
we carried out an ANOVA with monkey (1 or 2) and eccentricity (3° in experiment 2 or 6° in 
experiment 3) as factors. In accordance with Bouma’s law, there was a significant main effect of 
eccentricity (p < 0.01). The interaction between monkey and eccentricity was not significant (p = 
0.12). 
To determine whether letter size influenced critical spacing with eccentricity held constant, 
we carried out an ANOVA with monkey (1 or 2) and size (1° in experiment 1 or 0.5° in experiment 
3) as factors. In accordance with Bouma’s law, size had no significant main effect on critical 
spacing (p = 0.21). However, the interaction between monkey and size did approach significance 
(p = 0.065). Post hoc analysis revealed that this effect arose from a tendency in monkey 1 for the 
critical spacing to increase in conjunction with letter size (two-tailed t-test, p = 0.01). In monkey 
1, a 100% increase in letter size produced a 25% increase in critical spacing. In monkey 2, it 
produced a 4% decrease. Even the effect observed in monkey 1 was far too small to support an 
explanation based solely on lateral masking. 
Each of the aforementioned ANOVAs revealed a marginally significant main effect of 
monkey (p = 0.03 when eccentricity was a factor and p = 0.07 when size was a factor). This  
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arose from a tendency for the critical spacing to be smaller in monkey 1 than in monkey 2. It is not 
surprising that there should have been a difference between the monkeys. Humans also show inter-
individual differences in critical spacing (Toet and Levi, 1992).  
In each block of trials, the monkey was required to discriminate between two pairs of 
targets out of the five that were available for testing (Fig. 4B). To be sure that the results 
generalized across targets, we sorted the data from all of the blocks by target-pair. We found that 
overall accuracy varied with target-identity (ANOVA with target-pair as factor, p < 0.01 for both 
M1 and M2), with the pattern of dependence differing between monkeys as if each had learned 
some target-pairs better than others. To test whether the dependence of critical spacing on 
Figure 8. Experiment 3. A, The target was placed at an eccentricity of 6° in the right visual field. Each target and 
flanker subtended 0.5°. B, Flankers were spaced at five center-to-center distances from the target. In a sixth condition, 
flankers were absent. C, Accuracy as a function of spacing in monkey 1. Each data point reflects the mean over all 
blocks. Error bars indicate the SEM across blocks. The green curve is fit to five points representing performance when 
flankers were present. The dashed green line indicates the critical spacing defined as the inflection point of the fitted 
curve. The red and blue curves are carried over from experiments 1 and 2 for comparison. D, Equivalent psychometric 
data for monkey 2.  
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eccentricity in experiments 2 and 3 was a function of target-identity, we carried out an ANOVA 
on data from each monkey with target-pair and eccentricity as factors. This revealed no significant 
main effect of target-pair (p = 0.25 and 0.19 in M1 and M2), a significant main effect of 
eccentricity (p < 0.01 for M1 and M2) and, critically, no significant interaction (p = 0.35 and 0.94 
in M1 and M2). To test whether the lack of dependence of critical spacing on size in experiments 
1 and 3 was a function of target-identity, we carried out an ANOVA on data from each monkey 
with target-pair and size as factors. This revealed no significant main effect of target-pair (p = 0.27 
and 0.61 in M1 and M2), no significant main effect of size (p = 0.08 and 0.81 in M1 and M2) and, 
critically, no significant interaction (p = 0.72 and 0.85 in M1 and M2). We conclude that the key 
results of the study did not depend on the identity of the targets. 
 Finally, we asked whether an identical approach would yield comparable results in humans. 
This step was motivated by two considerations. First, prior exposure to letters was different in the 
monkeys than it typically is in human subjects. The monkeys were intensively trained on arbitrary 
letter-saccade associations whereas human subjects are literate. Second, the method by which we 
computed the critical distance in monkeys was adapted to their particular pattern of performance. 
In particular, we fitted a curve to data derived exclusively from flanker-present conditions. Using 
stimuli and methods of analysis identical to those employed in the monkey study, we assessed 
Figure 9. Comparison of critical spacing 
across experiments 1-3. For statistical 
comparison, critical spacing was estimated 
separately for each block of trials. The 
height of each bar indicates the mean of 
critical spacing across all 24 blocks in a 
given experiment. Each error bar indicates 
the SEM across the blocks. Critical 
spacing, as indicated by bar height, was 
almost entirely unrelated to object size, 
which is indicated by the dashed line 
superimposed on each bar. 
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crowding in two human participants (see Supplementary Materials: Human Experiments 
Paralleling the Monkey Experiments). The results were closely similar to those obtained in 
monkeys (Fig. 11). An ANOVA on critical spacing values with species (monkey or human) and 
experiment (1, 2 or 3) as factors revealed a marginally significant effect of species (p = 0.035), a 
highly significant effect of experiment (p = 3.5 x 10-14) and no interaction effect (p = 0.21). The 
absence of a significant interaction effect indicates that the pattern of variation across experimental 
conditions (the signature of crowding) did not differ between species. In one additional human 
experiment, we showed that expanding the set of test conditions to include smaller target-flanker 
spacings exerted no systematic effect on measured critical spacing (see Supplementary Materials: 
Human Experiment with Narrow Spacing and Fig. 12). We conclude that the observations obtained 
in monkeys are not an artifact either of their specialized experience with letters or of the methods 
of analysis necessary for characterizing their behavior. 
2.4 DISCUSSION 
We have carried out tests in macaque monkeys to determine whether they exhibit visual 
crowding. The key findings are the following. First, the ability of the monkeys to identify a 
peripheral target declined with decreasing distance between the target and the surrounding 
flankers. Second, the critical spacing scaled with eccentricity. Third, the critical spacing did not 
scale with object size. Together these results meet the standard diagnostic criteria for crowding 
(Levi, 2008; Pelli et al., 2004; Pelli and Tillman, 2008). This is the first demonstration that 
nonhuman primates exhibit crowding. The finding that crowding occurs in monkeys means that it 
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will be possible in the future to investigate the neuronal underpinnings with invasive methods not 
generally applicable in human studies.  
2.4.1 Comparison with Human Crowding Literature 
The average critical spacing for monkeys in this study was 0.26 φ where φ denotes target 
eccentricity. For humans tested under identical conditions, the average critical spacing was 0.25 
φ. These values are lower than the value of 0.5 φ reported in the classic study of Bouma (1970). 
Many other reports on crowding also describe values less than 0.5 φ. Pelli and colleagues (2004) 
note, with regard to results from a particular series of experiments, that “Bouma was right to say 
‘roughly’ 0.5. For some of our data, this value drops as low as 0.3.” Similarly, Chung et al. (2001) 
list, in their Table 1, prior studies yielding critical spacings as low as 0.1 φ and as high as 0.5 φ. 
Variability in measurements of critical spacing can arise from many sources. These include the 
arrangement of the elements in the display (Toet and Levi, 1992), the degree of similarity between 
the targets and distractors (Kooi et al., 1994), the duration of the display (Tripathy and Cavanagh, 
2002), the predictability of the display’s location (Yeshurun and Rashal, 2010) and the amount of 
prior training of the observers (Chung et al., 2007). The outcome also is dependent on the method 
for computing critical spacing. At present, no single method can be taken as representing a gold 
standard. The clipped line fit (Pelli et al., 2004) gives comparatively large readings because it 
yields a critical distance that lies close to the shoulder of the performance-versus-distance function. 
The approach of fitting a continuous curve to the data and noting the point at which it intersects a 
criterial performance level (Tripathy and Cavanagh, 2002) yields comparatively small readings 
because, with commonly used criteria, the intersection occurs on the slope rather than at the 
shoulder of the performance-versus-distance function. Our approach falls into the latter category. 
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To determine how our measurements of critical spacing compare to results obtained in 
previous studies, we carried out detailed analyses of data from two studies employing methods 
similar to ours and reporting results independently for multiple individuals. Details are provided 
in Supplementary Materials. Toet and Levi (1992) graphically depict, in Figure 6, the critical 
spacings of six individuals. Most relevant for comparison are horizontal critical spacings for 
displays centered on the horizontal meridian at eccentricities of 2.5°, 5° and 10°. We found, by 
taking measurements directly from the figure, that the critical spacing, as measured across all 
individuals and eccentricities, had a mean of 0.27 φ. Table 1 of Chung (2007) contains values from 
which the critical spacings of eight observers may be derived. We found that the critical spacings 
of individuals studied before intensive training, and thus comparable to our human observers, had 
a mean of 0.20 φ. The studies just discussed examined crowding induced by two rather than four 
flankers. There is little difference between critical spacings measured under two-flanker and four-
flanker conditions (Pelli et al., 2004). Nevertheless, we thought it worthwhile to compare our 
results to those of a study that also employed four flankers. The “same colour” data points in Figure 
2 of  Põder (2007) represent the average performance of seven observers required to identify a 0.5° 
letter flanked by four other letters at an eccentricity of 3.3° - a close match to the geometry of 
displays employed in experiment 2 of our study. Applying our estimation procedure to these data 
points yielded a critical spacing of 0.23 φ (see Supplementary Materials: Analysis of Data from 
Prior Studies and Fig. 13). We conclude that our measurements of critical spacing are compatible 
with results reported previously.  
In our study, both monkey and human observers exhibited some degree of flanker cost: 
performance even at the largest spacing tested was worse than when targets were presented in 
isolation as singletons. Among the monkeys, the mean percent correct for the largest spacing was 
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80% as compared to 86% under the singleton condition, giving a flanker cost of 6%. Among the 
humans, the mean percent correct for the largest spacing was 93% as compared to 98% under the 
singleton condition, giving a flanker cost of 5%. Flanker cost could arise from any of several 
sources. It might reflect genuine albeit weak crowding arising when flankers encroach on the 
penumbra of the crowding field. It might arise from a reduction of attention to the target induced 
by the presence of flankers. It might arise from basing report on a flanker rather than on the target. 
Although we cannot identify the origin of the flanker cost in our study, we can ask whether it is 
comparable to the cost observed previously under parametrically equivalent conditions. In the 
monkeys of our study, the largest spacing was, on average across all experiments, 1.71 times the 
critical spacing. In our human observers, the ratio was 1.74. On the assumption that the flanker 
cost arises from genuine but weak crowding occurring when the flankers lie at the edge of the 
crowding field, we selected for comparison a prior study in which the ratio was approximately the 
same (Chung, 2007). Measurements taken from Figure 4 and parameters taken from Table 1 of the 
cited paper indicate that the largest tested spacing was, on average across all eight observers, 1.76 
times the critical spacing. Among observers in the cited study, the mean percent correct score for 
the largest spacing was 82% as compared to 99% under the singleton condition, giving a flanker 
cost of 16% with rounding error. Details are provided in Supplementary Materials. We conclude 
that the flanker costs observed among monkeys and humans in our study did not exceed flanker 
costs observed in previous studies of crowding. 
2.4.2 Crowding versus Masking and Attention 
Crowding differs from ordinary masking in several ways preeminent among which is the 
pattern of dependence on target eccentricity and size (Levi et al., 2002b; Pelli et al., 2004; Tripathy 
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and Cavanagh, 2002). In crowding, the critical spacing scales with eccentricity independently of 
size, whereas, in masking, the reverse is true. To a very close approximation, the results that we 
obtained in both monkeys and humans conformed to the pattern expected from crowding. In 
monkeys there was a slight deviation from the ideal insofar as, when letters were presented at an 
eccentricity of 6°, the critical spacing was slightly greater if the target subtended 1° than if it 
subtended 0.5° (Fig. 9). This effect was not significant in the combined data but did achieve 
significance in a post hoc test on data from monkey 1. We do not believe that this argues against 
interpreting our results as due to crowding for the following reasons. First, the results for both 
monkeys conformed much more closely to the pattern expected from crowding than to that 
expected from masking. Second, the dependence on target size was weak and inconsistent. Third, 
it has been observed in some studies of crowding in humans that the critical spacing increases 
slightly as target size increases (Levi et al., 2002b; Tripathy and Cavanagh, 2002).  
Distinguishing the effects of crowding from the effects of attention is a difficult challenge 
because the two processes may be closely related. It has been hypothesized that the critical spacing 
arises from a limit on the spatial resolution of visual attention (Cavanagh et al., 1999; He et al., 
1996; Intriligator and Cavanagh, 2001). We know at present only that crowding and attention 
interact. For example, precueing the hemifield in which the display will appear (Yeshurun and 
Rashal, 2010) or planning an eye movement to the target (Harrison et al., 2013) shrinks the critical 
spacing. The effects of attention and crowding are dissociable under special circumstances, for 
example when subjects judge average orientation across a group of Gabor patches (Dakin et al., 
2009). However, the design of our study did not allow a firm dissociation.  
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2.4.3 Limitations of the Present Study 
The tasks presented in this paper were designed to be performed by nonhuman primates in 
conjunction with neurophysiological recording. The design therefore differs in some regards from 
methods established in psychophysical studies on humans. We tested only two subjects of each 
species, we presented a limited library of target and flanker letters, and we required subjects to 
discriminate only between two orientations of each letter. Possibly as a result of these experimental 
choices, our results exhibited some patterns not typically present in psychophysical studies of 
crowding in humans.  
First, flanker cost was highly variable across tasks and across subjects. Most strikingly, 
monkey 2 exhibited a flanker cost of 19% during experiment 2 (Fig. 7D), but only 6% for 
experiment 1 (Fig. 6D) and 1% for experiment 3 (Fig. 8D). In contrast, monkey 1 exhibited a 
sizeable flanker cost for experiment 1 (8%, Fig. 6C) compared to smaller flanker costs for 
experiment 2 (2%, Fig. 7C) and experiment 3 (3%, Fig. 8C). Flanker cost varied across subjects 
and experiments in the human studies as well, but to a lesser degree (Fig. 11). It is possible that, 
with more practice, greater motivation, or better sampling of target-distractor distances, the mean 
and variance of flanker cost would have decreased. To minimize and stabilize flanker cost would 
be a desirable goal for future experiments in nonhuman primates.  
We also observed considerable variability in the lower asymptote of the psychometric 
function and in its slope. To accommodate this variability, we adopted a curve fitting procedure 
that allowed these parameters to vary independently. Variability across individuals might have 
been less had we tailored letter size to the acuity limit of each subject (Chung, 2007). Additionally, 
we might have used a larger set of targets so as to prevent performance based on idiosyncratically 
selected diagnostic features. Steps such as these, aimed at equating to the greatest extent possible 
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the performance of different individuals, would be a desirable feature of future experiments in 
nonhuman primates. 
Finally, monkey 1 exhibited a significant reduction in critical spacing when letter size was 
decreased with all other factors held constant. This effect suggests that crowding was confounded 
with masking when the larger letters closely abutted. It would be desirable, in future experiments, 
to avoid this problem through the use of relatively small targets. 
2.4.4 Questions for Future Physiological Inquiry 
We know from human studies that crowding is a cortical phenomenon (Flom et al., 1963a) 
increasing in magnitude along the ventral stream (Anderson et al., 2012; Bi et al., 2009). However, 
much remains to be learned about the underlying neuronal mechanisms. Having established that 
monkeys experience crowding, we are now in a position to attack these questions in experiments 
based on neuronal recording. There are at least two fundamental outstanding questions about the 
neuronal correlates of crowding that could be addressed in such experiments. 
2.4.4.1 Reduction in Strength 
We take inferotemporal cortex as an example in terms of which to consider this question. 
This region is a logical candidate for the study of crowding because it is necessary for the efficient 
discrimination of letter-like images (Cowey and Gross, 1970) and because it contains neurons 
selective for letter-like stimuli (Sripati and Olson, 2010a). We speculate that crowding is manifest 
among inferotemporal neurons in the form of a reduction in the strength of the signal encoding the 
identity of the target. The neuronal representation of an image is reduced by the simultaneous 
presence of other images even when they are separated by distances greater than those at which 
  35 
crowding occurs (Zhang et al., 2011; Zoccolan et al., 2005). The reduction takes a form well 
described in terms of divisive normalization (Carandini and Heeger, 2011). When images are far 
apart, neuronal activity representing the identity of a given item can be restored to almost normal 
strength by allocating top-down attention to it (Chelazzi et al., 1998; Moran and Desimone, 1985; 
Zhang et al., 2011). When images are close together, this mechanism might fail either because 
bottom-up pooling of information about the target and flankers has rendered the target unavailable 
for independent selection (Parkes et al., 2001) or because the spatial resolution of top-down 
attention is limited (He et al., 1996). In either event, one would expect the neuronal signal 
representing the identity of the target to become progressively weaker, and attentional selection to 
become progressively less effective, as the elements of the display move closer to each other over 
the range of distances at which crowding operates. To test this prediction would require no more 
than recording target-discriminating neuronal activity during performance of the crowding task. 
2.4.4.2 Qualitative Change 
In the simplest form of the bottom-up pooling model (Parkes et al., 2001) and in any model 
based on the limited spatial resolution of top-down attention (He et al., 1996), one would expect 
inferotemporal cortex neurons to fire at a rate representing the average of rates elicited by the 
separate elements of the display considered individually. However, there are other models in which 
the weakening of the representation of the target results from a more profoundly nonlinear 
interaction with the flankers that cannot be explained by divisive normalization. It has been 
proposed that the degradation of the target representation arises from the computation of textural 
statistics  (Balas et al., 2009), from the illusory conjunction of features (Greenwood et al., 2010; 
Pelli et al., 2004; Põder and Wagemans, 2007), from substitution of a flanker for a target (Freeman 
et al., 2012), and from a combination of these processes (Hanus and Vul, 2013). Each of these 
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scenarios gives rise to specific predictions, potentially testable in a neuronal recording experiment, 
concerning the effect of the presence of the flankers on neuronal selectivity for the target.  
2.5 SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL 
2.5.1 Human Experiments Paralleling the Monkey Experiments 
The results of human experiments paralleling the monkey experiments are presented in the 
main text and depicted in Fig. 11. We describe in this section the methodology of the human 
experiments. 
Two right-handed adults, both female, completed tests conducted under a protocol 
approved by the Institutional Review Board of Carnegie Mellon University. Subject 1 is an author 
(EC). The other subject was unaware of the specific purpose of the experiment. All spatial 
conditions, including screen distance and the configuration, size and eccentricity of the stimuli, 
Figure 10. Varying the curve-fitting procedure had only a minimal effect on estimates of critical spacing. A, Critical 
spacing estimated using a model in which the asymptote of the accuracy curve was fixed at the accuracy measured 
for singleton targets.  B, Critical spacing estimated using a model in which the slope was fixed at the average value 
measured across all three experiments. Conventions as for Fig. 9. 
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were identical to those imposed 
during the monkey experiment.  
Procedures for data analysis were 
likewise identical to those employed 
in the monkey experiment. We used a 
chin rest to enforce viewing distance 
and stabilize the head. 
For each experiment, the 
subject completed five blocks. A 
block consisted of 192 trials 
conforming to the same conditions as 
in the corresponding monkey 
experiment. Each block used two pairs 
of targets just as in the monkey 
experiment. Across the five blocks, 
each of the five pairs of targets was 
employed twice. At the beginning of 
each block, to solidify the target-
response associations, the subject 
performed 16 practice trials with 
singleton targets. These were not 
included in the analytic dataset. 
Figure 11. Results from human subjects performing the same tasks 
as the monkeys. A, Experiment 1. Conventions as in Fig. 6. B, 
Experiment 2. Conventions as in Fig. 7. C, Experiment 3. 
Conventions as in Fig. 8. D, Comparison across experiments 1-3. 
Conventions as in Fig. 9. 
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A trial began with onset of a fixation point in the center of the screen (Fig. 4A). When the 
subject had attained fixation and was ready to view the array, she pressed the spacebar. This 
triggered the immediate appearance of the display. The duration of the display was restricted to 
100 ms so as to negate any contribution from reflexive saccades. The subject reported the identity 
of the target by pressing a key on a keyboard. Responses on the up and down arrow keys were 
mapped onto the targets according to the same rules that governed upward and downward saccades 
in monkey 1 (Fig. 4B).   Feedback was given on each trial in the form of a click if the response 
was correct and silence otherwise. A trial in which the subject hit neither key was repeated later in 
the block. Trials in which the response was incorrect were not repeated. 
 
2.5.2 Human Experiment with Narrow Spacing 
We carried out an additional set of tests in subject 1 to determine whether measurements 
of critical spacing would be significantly altered by expanding the set of test conditions to include 
smaller target-flanker spacings. 
Experiment 2 was repeated with center-to-center spacings that included, in addition to the 
six used previously, a narrower spacing of 0.4°. We reduced the letter size to 0.3° so that at even 
the narrowest spacing the targets and flankers would not touch. The principles of blocking and 
trial structure were the same as in the original version of the experiment. A run encompassed 32 
trials at each of seven flanker spacings for a total trial count of 224. The subject completed five 
runs just as in the original version of the experiment. Critical spacing for subject 1 in the original 
experiment was 0.60° ± 0.02°. Critical spacing in the modified experiment was 0.64° ± 0.04° (Fig. 
12A,C). The difference was not signficant (two-sample t-test, t(8) = 0.79, p = 0.45).  
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Experiment 3 was repeated with center-to-center spacings that included, in addition to the 
six used previously, a narrower spacing of 0.75°. The principles of blocking and trial structure 
were the same as in the original version of the experiment. A run encompassed 32 trials at each of 
seven flanker spacings for a total trial count of 224. The subject completed five runs just as in the 
original version of the experiment. Critical spacing for subject 1 in the original experiment was 
1.55° ± 0.12°. Critical spacing for the same subject in the modified experiment was 1.19° ± 0.21° 
(Fig. 12B,C). The difference, although not significant (two-sample t-test, t(8) = 1.43, p = 0.19), 
was in the direction expected from previous demonstrations that training can ameliorate crowding 
within limits (Chung, 2007). To determine whether the critical spacing of subject 1 had achieved 
stability at this point, we repeated the experiment modified to include seven flanker spacings. The 
resulting measure of critical spacing 
(1.30° ± 0.20°) was not significantly 
different from the measures obtained 
in the original experiment (two-
sample t-test, t(8) = 1.12, p = 0.30) 
and the previous run of the modified 
experiment (two-sample t-test, t(8) = 
0.45, p = 0.66). 
To summarize: including in 
the test set a condition with 
especially narrow spacing led to an 
increase in measured critical spacing 
in one case and a decrease in the other 
Figure 12. Results from human subject 1 collected under conditions in 
which the set of center-to-center spacings had been expanded to include 
an especially small spacing. Details in Supplementary Materials: Human 
Experiment with Narrow Spacing. A, Modified experiment 2. B, 
Modified experiment 3. C, Critical spacings measured in the two 
experiments. Conventions as in Fig. 11.  
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case, with neither change statistically significant.  We conclude that including a condition with 
narrower spacing in the test set did not produce a systematic change in critical spacing.  
2.5.3 Analysis of Data from Prior Studies 
2.5.3.1 Measuring Critical Spacing in Toet and Levi (1992) 
We based our analysis on Figure 6 of the cited paper. For each subject, we measured the 
distance from the central point to the circle at 10° eccentricity along the horizontal axis. We 
computed the average of the six measured lengths to get X, the distance in the figure corresponding 
to 10°. For each subject, we measured the horizontal extent of the interaction polygon for a target 
placed at 10° horizontal eccentricity (L10) and did likewise for targets placed at 5° (L5) horizontal 
eccentricity and 2.5° (L2.5) horizontal eccentricity. From these widths, we computed critical 
spacing (c) as a fraction of eccentricity (φ) using the formula given below. The term of 0.5 in the 
numerator adjusts for the fact that each horizontal line encompassed two center-to-center distances. 
      
𝑐𝜑 =
0.5𝐿𝜑
𝜑
10
𝑋
     Eq. 2 
       
The mean across all subjects and eccentricities was 0.27 φ with a standard deviation of 
0.13 φ. The results for the individual subjects are given in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Critical spacing relative to eccentricity in Toet and Levi (1992). 
Subject c2.5° c5° c10° 
AT 0.48 0.46 0.35 
JT 0.24 0.25 0.49 
MS 0.08 0.12 0.20 
JE --- 0.17 0.39 
JW 0.27 0.18 0.18 
PB 0.32 0.20 0.17 
2.5.3.2 Measuring Critical Spacing in Chung (2007) 
The aim of this analysis was to compute in units of eccentricity (φ) the pre-test spatial 
extent of crowding provided for each subject in Table 1 of the cited paper. The eccentricity of the 
target was always 10°. The spatial extent of crowding (S) is given in units of letter size. Letter size 
for each subject was 1.4 times the critical print size. The critical print size (P, in degrees) is 
provided for each subject in Table 1. We used the following conversion formula: 
𝑐𝜑 =
1.4𝑆𝑃
10
     Eq. 3 
The mean across all subjects was 0.20 φ with a standard deviation of 0.05 φ. The values 
for the individual subjects are provided in Table 2. 
Table 2. Critical spacing relative to eccentricity in Chung (2007). 
Subject S P c 
AS 0.97 0.95 0.13 
LG 1.08 1.38 0.21 
MM 1.08 1.64 0.25 
NV 1.26 1.4 0.25 
SA 1.2 1.26 0.21 
SU 1.33 1.5 0.28 
SW 1.12 0.97 0.15 
TN 0.93 1.17 0.15 
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2.5.3.3 Measuring Critical Spacing in Põder (2007) 
The aim of this analysis was to compute in units of 
eccentricity (φ) the spatial extent of crowding for “same 
colour” data presented in Figure 2 of the cited paper. We 
measured the height of each point on the plot and and linearly 
transformed each height into the appropriate units. Then we 
applied our inflection point method for calculating critical 
spacing (Eq. 1). The resulting critical spacing was 0.23 φ.  The 
curve fit is depicted according to our conventions in Figure 
13. 
2.5.3.4 Measuring Distractor Cost in Chung (2007) 
We quantified distractor cost by taking measurements from Figure 4 of the cited paper. In 
the plot for each subject, we inferred the percent correct in the absence of distractors (A) from the 
height of the horizontal dashed line by taking the ratio of this height to the height of the y-axis. 
Likewise, we inferred the percent correct in the presence of distractors at the largest spacing tested 
(D) from the height of the rightmost open symbol. The distractor cost was given by A-D. The mean 
of A-D across all subjects was 16.1% with a standard deviation of 7.0%. The values for the 
individual subjects are provided in Table 3.  
Figure 13.  Application of our method for 
estimating critical spacing to data from 
Fig. 2 of Põder (2007). Inset indicates the 
geometry of the display in the task on 
which the figure is based. Conventions as 
in Fig. 12. 
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Table 3. Widest spacing versus critical spacing in Chung (2007). 
Subject A D A-D 
AS 99.8 90.2 9.6 
LG 99.8 90.2 9.6 
MM 99.5 76.0 23.5 
NV 95.2 85.4 9.7 
SA 99.8 80.4 19.4 
SU 94.8 71.0 23.8 
SW 99.5 76.0 23.5 
TN 100.0 90.2 9.8 
2.5.3.5 Widest Spacing versus Critical Spacing in Chung (2007) 
The widest spacing tested (W, in units equal to 1.4 times the critical print size) was 2.0 in 
all subjects except AS, in whom it was 1.6. The critical spacing (S, in units equal to 1.4 times the 
critical print size) is given for each subject in column 1 of Chung’s Table 1. To express the widest 
spacing tested as a ratio of the critical spacing, we computed W/S. The mean of W/S across all 
subjects was 1.76 with a standard deviation of 0.20. The values for the individual subjects are 
provided in Table 4. 
Table 4. Comparing critical spacing to widest spacing in Chung (2007). 
Subject W S W/S 
AS 1.6 0.97 1.65 
LG 2.0 1.08 1.85 
MM 2.0 1.08 1.85 
NV 2.0 1.26 1.59 
SA 2.0 1.2 1.67 
SU 2.0 1.33 1.50 
SW 2.0 1.12 1.79 
TN 2.0 0.93 2.15 
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3.0  CROWDING CONFUSES THE NEURONAL CODE 
Peripheral vision suffers from information loss, not only from acuity, but by the mysterious 
phenomenon known as crowding, in which the presence of clutter causes perfectly recognizable 
objects in isolation to become a jumbled hodgepodge. Although crowding has been studied 
extensively for the last half century in humans, methodological limitations have prevented the field 
from asking questions about the fundamental brain mechanisms behind crowding. Of particular 
interest is how crowding affects the neurons associated with object recognition. We recorded 
single neuron responses from macaque monkeys in a series of experiments, each designed to get 
at different aspects of crowding. First, we discovered that crowding qualitatively altered neuronal 
preferences, thus confusing the object code. Next, we observed that aspects of this code change 
persisted even when the entire display was scaled up to escape crowding. Finally, we showed that 
even non-adjacent parts of crowded objects interact.  
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In primates, the visual representation of peripheral space is crowded, meaning that an item 
recognizable on its own becomes unintelligible when imbedded in clutter. Crowded objects don’t 
disappear or blur, but rather they devolve into a jumble of features. Because the vast majority of 
visual space is peripheral and objects rarely appear in isolation, crowding is ubiquitous. Crowding 
affects everything from reading speed (Pelli et al., 2007) to avoiding obstacles while driving 
(Whitney and Levi, 2011).  
Fortunately, crowding provides a natural experiment in which feature detection and feature 
integration are decoupled (Pelli et al., 2004). These early stages of visual processing are critical 
for laying the foundations for object representation. Therefore, the study of crowding may provide 
new insights about how objects are represented in the brain. 
The computational mechanism underlying crowding has been variously characterized as 
averaging of visual signals for nearby stimuli (Greenwood et al., 2009; Harrison and Bex, 2015; 
Parkes et al., 2001), confusion between target and distractor elements (Chastain, 1982; Freeman 
et al., 2012; Strasburger and Malania, 2013), and reducing objects to texture (Balas et al., 2009; 
Freeman and E. P. Simoncelli, 2011; Lettvin, 1976). At the implementation level, regions over 
which crowded stimuli interact could be set by receptive fields (Flom et al., 1963b; Freeman and 
E. P. Simoncelli, 2011; Keshvari and Rosenholtz, 2016), cortical distance (Mareschal et al., 2010; 
Pelli, 2008), or the spotlight of spatial attention (Chen et al., 2014; He et al., 1996). Even the motor 
system gets a piece of the action with the hypothesis that crowding results from limitations in the 
accuracy of saccadic eye movements (Harrison et al., 2013; Nandy and Tjan, 2012).   
Largely, theories of crowding have been shaped by psychophysical experiments, which 
cannot get at neuronal mechanisms directly. To delve into the brain-based origins of crowding, 
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several groups have recently turned to brain imaging (Anderson et al., 2012; Bi et al., 2009; Chen 
et al., 2014; Fang and He, 2008; Millin et al., 2013) and EEG (Chen et al., 2014; Ronconi et al., 
2016). From these studies, we have learned that crowding appears to be a multi-stage process 
(Ronconi et al., 2016) that is evident as early as V1 (Millin et al., 2013) and increases along the 
ventral visual hierarchy (Anderson et al., 2012), peaking in LOC (Herzog et al., 2015). Despite 
this success with mapping where crowding is apparent in the brain, the spatial and temporal 
resolution of fMRI and EEG are not sufficient to capture how individual neurons within those 
brain regions encode crowded and uncrowded stimuli.  
To draw firm conclusions concerning the neuronal underpinnings of crowding will require 
studying the phenomenon by means of invasive techniques such as are typically employed in 
nonhuman primates. Having shown previously that nonhuman primates exhibit the same 
behavioral hallmarks of crowding as humans during  a task conducive to neurophysiology 
(Crowder and Olson, 2015), we are poised to be the first to directly explore the crowding 
phenomenon at the level of single neurons.  
The aim of the present study was to determine how crowding affects the neuronal code 
underlying visual object representation in the pinnacle of the ventral stream, a region known as 
inferotemporal cortex (IT). We recorded individual neurons IT of two macaque monkeys while 
they either passively viewed or discriminated between peripheral letters under various degrees of 
crowding. Since IT is known to be important for object recognition (Ungerleider and Mishkin, 
1982) and tracks perception (Sheinberg and Logothetis, 1997), the effect of crowding on the 
neuronal code for peripheral objects should be evident at the level of IT.  
Specifically, we tested two specific hypotheses. First, crowding could impair object 
recognition by weakening neuronal selectivity, as predicted by averaging models (Greenwood et 
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al., 2009; Harrison and Bex, 2015; Parkes et al., 2001). A second possibility is that crowding could 
qualitatively change the neuronal code to confuse downstream neurons, as predicted by feature 
substitution models (Chastain, 1982; Freeman et al., 2012; Strasburger, 2005). 
What we discovered first was that crowding both qualitatively altered neuronal preferences 
and quantitatively weakened selectivity. This qualitative change could be decomposed into main 
effects and interaction effects. Only qualitative changes to interaction effects seemed to vary with 
absolute spacing – rather than relative spacing – the way that crowding does behaviorally. Finally, 
we showed that even non-adjacent parts of crowded objects interacted.  
3.2 MATERIALS AND METHODS 
3.2.1 Animals and Equipment 
Two adult male rhesus macaque monkeys (Macaca mulatta) were used in these 
experiments (monkey 1 and monkey 2). Experimental procedures were approved by the Carnegie 
Mellon University Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee and were in compliance with the 
United States Public Health Service Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals. Before 
the recording period, each monkey was surgically fitted with a cranial implant and headpost (Crist 
Instrument). After initial training, a 2 cm-diameter vertically oriented cylindrical recording 
chamber (Crist) was implanted over the left hemisphere in both monkeys. In both animals MRI 
brain scans were used to position the chamber mediolaterally above the superior temporal sulcus 
and rostrocaudally above anterior medial temporal sulcus. 
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 For behavioral testing, each monkey was seated in a primate chair with the head stabilized 
using the headpost. Events during each trial were controlled by Cortex software (NIMH). Visual 
stimuli were presented on a 17” LCD screen with 1024 x 768 pixels of resolution positioned 18” 
from the animal’s eyes. The precise time at which images appeared on the screen was recorded 
using a photodetector circuit (designed by NIMH) and built in-house. Eye position was tracked by 
an infrared system (ISCAN). The system was calibrated by requiring the monkey, at the beginning 
of each block of trials, to fixate a small target presented successively at four locations 
corresponding to the corners of a 14° x 14° square centered on the screen. Offline, the readings on 
each trial were converted to degrees of visual angle by performing a linear transformation based 
on the stored calibration voltages. 
After the initial behavioral training was complete, Each day’s recording session would 
begin with the insertion of a varnish-coated tungsten microelectrode with an initial impedance of  
1.0 M  at 1 kHz (FHC) into the temporal lobe through a transdural guide tube advanced using a 
hydraulic microdrive (Narishige). When mapping a new track electrodes were lowered to a depth 
such that its tip was 10 mm above the superior temporal sulcus, as estimated from MRI images of 
each animal’s brain. Using a grid inside the chamber with 1mm spacing between holes (Crist) the 
electrode could be advanced reproducibly along the same tracks day to day. The action potentials 
of a single neuron were isolated online by means of a commercially available spike-sorting system 
(Plexon). All threshold-crossing waveforms were recorded during the experiments. The threshold 
was chosen such that some noise and multiunits were recorded along with the single unit isolations. 
Final spike sorting was performed manually offline. 
Neurons were probed first with a set of 32 colorful photographs of objects to see whether 
they were visually-responsive. If so, they were further tested with relevant stimuli from the specific 
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experiments, which were presented foveally and in isolation during this initial phase to ensure that 
neurons and stimuli were selected in a way that remained agnostic to experimental questions. 
Stimuli were chosen to maximize both the mean and the range of firing rates evoked by the 
stimulus set. 
3.2.2 Tasks and training 
Monkeys were trained to fixate and discriminate peripheral letters as described previously 
(Crowder and Olson, 2015). Each animal engaged in three distinct tasks, which are described 
separately in the Results. All experiments were run as separate blocks with trials presented in a 
pseudorandom order. Incomplete or incorrect trials were repeated at random later in the block.  
Although monkey 2 performed adequately on the similar behavioral tasks employed in our 
prior study (Crowder and Olson, 2015), following chamber implantation surgery this animal could 
not be motivated to report perceived stimulus identity. As a result, he only engaged in passive 
viewing in the present study. In all cases where monkey 1 performed a behavioral task while 
monkey 2 merely fixated, we performed analyses separately for the two animals to ensure that this 
behavioral difference did not meaningfully affect the results.  
3.2.3 Data Analysis 
Neurons were only considered for analysis if for all trials combined they fired at a 
significantly higher rate in the period 70 to 270 ms after stimulus onset compared to the baseline 
period, -100 to 50 ms. Significance was assessed using a paired Student’s t-test with  = 0.05.  
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Peristimulus time histograms (PSTHs) were computed by aligning spikes to the time the 
photodetector registered the onset of the stimulus, counting the spikes in each 1ms bin, and 
convolving with an alpha function designed with time constants measured for excitatory post-
synaptic potentials (1ms for growth, 20ms for decay) (Hanes et al., 1995). This approach has two 
advantages over smoothing with a gaussian kernel. First, it is a causal filter so it does not smear 
the timing of spikes to earlier timepoints. Second, it avoids the arbitrariness of choosing the 
standard deviation of the gaussian kernel because the time constants used in the alpha function are 
derived from physiology. 
Before combining the responses of individual neurons into population responses for any of 
the analyses used in this study, neuronal preferences were determined using a leave-one-out cross-
validation procedure. All trials but one were used to determine the neuronal preference, and 
depending on the stimulus presented on the held-out trial it could be labeled as either “preferred” 
or “non-preferred.” This procedure was iterated until all trials were labeled. The advantage of this 
method is that it makes full use of all trials without introducing bias that would cause pure noise 
to appear selective. Unless otherwise noted, spike counts were always taken from the period 70ms 
to 270ms after stimulus onset, which captures the typical latency and transient burst of 
inferotemporal cortex neurons. 
We used correlation analysis to compare how consistently populations of neurons 
responded across different conditions. To put these correlations in context of a theoretical ceiling 
we also computed the correlation across neurons within the same condition. Naturally, this 
required a split halves approach. To correct for reducing the number of paired observations by 
half, we used the Spearman-Brown prediction formula (Brown, 1910; Spearman, 1910). 
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To understand how letters interfere with one another during crowding, we divided neuronal 
responses into pairwise main effects and interaction effects. Main effects measure the strength of 
firing rate selectivity between different stimulus identities, regardless of other factors. In contrast, 
interaction effects measure how the identity of one stimulus affects the spike rate evoked by 
another. The simplest way to explain pairwise main and interaction effects is to imagine a two-by-
two matrix in which columns represent the levels of the top element and rows represent the levels 
of the bottom element. Each box contains a mean firing rate for that particular set of top and bottom 
elements.  
The main effect of the top element is then simply computed by taking the difference 
between the column averages and the main effect of the bottom element is equal to the difference 
between the row averages. Then the top and bottom element main effects can be averaged together 
to get a single main effect measurement. For interaction effects, we first calculated the average 
firing rate along the two diagonals of the two-by-two matrix, and then took the difference. Main 
and interaction effects were computed separately for each neuron. To combine these measurements 
into population metrics, we again used a leave-one-out approach to find preferred and non-
preferred stimuli. For each held out trial, we used the remaining trials to find the preferred and 
non-preferred top element, bottom element, and diagonal. Then once all the trials were labeled in 
this way, we computed the main and interaction effects for all the trials together and averaged 
these across neurons.  
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3.3 RESULTS 
Having demonstrated previously that macaque monkeys experience the hallmarks of visual 
crowding (Crowder and Olson, 2015) we sought to explore how crowding affects the 
inferotemporal cortex neuronal code in these same animals. To do this, we employed three 
complementary experiments, each designed to get at a different aspect of how crowding might 
impair neuronal object representations. Each will be discussed separately in the following sections. 
3.3.1 Experiment 1 
Since we are the first to pursue crowding at the single neuron level, our first experiment 
was designed to be a slightly simplified version of one of the tasks we used to demonstrate the 
crowding effect behaviorally in these animals (Crowder and Olson, 2015). Having both single unit 
spiking data and behavior from the same conditions we can then ask how the decline in behavioral 
accuracy characteristic of crowding correlates with changes in the neuronal code for the target of 
visual discrimination. There are two alternative hypotheses we aim to test. First, it could be that 
crowding diminishes the neuronal selectivity for the target through the well-characterized process 
of divisive normalization (Zoccolan et al., 2005). When stimuli are far apart divisive normalization 
can be overcome by attention (Chelazzi et al., 1993), but it remains a mystery whether this 
push/pull between attention and divisive normalization comes into play for crowded displays. A 
second hypothesis states that crowding disrupts the neuronal code for the target by qualitatively 
altering neuronal tuning. Under this regime, behavior would be disrupted not by weak target 
signals, but rather by confusing signals. These hypotheses make distinct predictions regarding 
  53 
strength of selectivity and consistency of the neuronal code between crowded and uncrowded 
displays and these are precisely what we aim to test in experiment 1. 
3.3.1.1 Task and Stimuli Design 
To ensure that our results would be pertinent to the phenomenon of crowding we kept the 
task essentially the same as experiment 1 in our previous paper (Crowder and Olson, 2015), except 
that we simplified it slightly by reducing the number of possible spacings between targets and 
flankers from five to three. This served to make the number of trials more manageable to complete 
while holding a stable neuronal isolation.   
On each trial, monkey 1 had to determine the identity of a target in the right visual field 
and indicate his choice by making a saccade directly above or below fixation (Fig. 14A). Monkey 
2 viewed the same displays but was not required to make saccades. The targets were Sloan letters 
A, F, H, U, and Z (courtesy of Denis Pelli) and counterparts obtained by rotating them 90°. A letter 
and its rotated counterpart were associated with saccades in opposite directions. The target–
saccade mapping is shown in Figure 14B. Flankers, when present, consisted of Sloan letters K, P, 
T, and Y. Their arrangement varied from trial to trial (Fig. 14C). Targets and flankers were 1° and 
had an aspect ratio of 1. The array was always centered at 6° eccentricity.  
The variable of interest was the center-to-center spacing between the target and the flankers 
(Fig. 14D). On a given trial, this could assume any of four values with equal likelihood, including 
1.1°, 1.8°, 2.5°, and infinity (target alone, hereafter referred to as “singleton”). Other incidental 
factors were fully counterbalanced against spacing. These factors included target identity, saccade 
direction, placement of the target in the upper or lower visual field, and flanker configuration. 
In each session, we employed as targets two letters and their rotated counterparts. The four 
targets appeared with equal frequency. Saccades in upward and downward directions were 
  54 
demanded with equal frequency because targets associated with the two directions were equally 
common. Likewise, in each block, the target appeared equally often 1° above and below the 0° 
horizontal meridian. The flankers could appear in any of four configurations (Fig. 14C). 
Full counterbalancing required 128 conditions, corresponding to all possible combinations 
of four spacings, four targets, two vertical locations, and four flanker configurations. The 
conditions were imposed in random order with the sole exception that each combination of target, 
spacing, and flanker occurred once in the first half of the block (when the display was centered at 
one vertical location) and again in the second half of the block (when the display was centered at 
the other vertical location). The sequence of vertical locations was upper-then-lower for half of the 
target–spacing–flanker combinations and lower-then-upper for the other half.  
The monkey had to complete eight trials successfully under each of the 128 conditions. A 
trial was considered successful if the monkey made a saccade in the correct direction (monkey 1) 
or maintained central fixation (monkey 2). Correct trials culminated in a juice reward followed by 
Figure 14. Experiment 1 task 
and stimulus design. A, The 
timing of task events for the 
discrimination task 
performed by monkey 1. The 
task for monkey 2 was the 
same except omitting the 
choice and saccade epochs. B, 
Half of the targets in the 
discrimination task 
corresponded to upward 
saccades while the other half 
were associated with 
downward saccades. C, The 
flankers surrounding the 
target always consisted of the 
same four Sloan letters, but 
they could be arranged in four 
different ways. D, The 
spacing between the target 
and flankers could be one of 
three values and targets were 
also presented as singletons. 
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an immediate advance to the next trial. A trial was aborted if the monkey’s gaze deviated by more 
than 2° horizontally or 3° vertically from the central fixation point during fixation periods or if 
they made a saccade to the stimulus array thereafter. These types of errors were rare and generally 
the animals maintained fixation tightly on the central spot both horizontally (mean and standard 
deviation 0.05°  0.67° for monkey 1 and 0.08°  0.68° for monkey 2) and vertically (0.26°  
0.88° for monkey 1 and 0.37°  0.97° for monkey 2). Breaking fixation or making an erroneous 
response resulted in withholding the reward and a time-out of several seconds. The failed condition 
was returned to the pool from which future trials would be drawn. We based neuronal analysis 
exclusively on the correct trials. 
3.3.1.2 Crowding Reduces the Strength of the Singleton Code 
As we showed previously (Crowder and Olson, 2015), target identification accuracy 
declined as a function of flanker spacing (Fig. 15A), which could be well fit with a two-parameter 
logit function (goodness-of-fit test, 2(29) = 0.004, p = 0.95). Accuracy was significantly lower 
when flankers were nearby compared to mid spacing (Wilcoxon signed rank test, z(29) = 3.84, p 
= 1.2 x 10-4), far spacing flankers (Wilcoxon signed rank test, z(29) = 4.54, p = 1.3 x 10-6), or 
singletons (Wilcoxon signed rank test, z(29) = 4.70, p 2.6 x 10-6). There were no other significant 
pairwise differences, so we consider the near spacing displays to be crowded whereas the mid and 
far spacing displays to be uncrowded. 
The purpose for incorporating behavior is so that we can map our neuronal results onto the 
perceptual accuracy. Because only near flankers significantly deteriorated accuracy, a true 
neuronal correlate of the crowding phenomenon should severely impair neuronal target selectivity 
only at when flankers are near the target, while sparing other conditions. Selectivity impairments 
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can take two primary forms: quantitative or qualitative. We will tackle the quantitative change 
first. Here we define neuronal preferences on the basis of singleton conditions, and operationalize 
selectivity as the mean firing rate difference between the most and least preferred targets. 
We recorded 38 visually-responsive neurons from monkey 1 and 33 visually-responsive 
neurons from monkey 2. For each neuron, we designated the most preferred (Fig. 15B) and least 
preferred (Fig. 15C) target on the basis of the singleton trials using a leave-one-out procedure (see 
Methods), which enabled us to compare selectivity between singletons and all spacing conditions 
fairly. Time-varying selectivity was computed for each spacing independently (Fig. 15D). As letter 
spacing decreased, neuronal selectivity significantly decreased as well (linear regression, F(71) = 
29.84, p = 6.8 x 10-7). Pairwise analysis revealed that selectivity was lower when flankers were 
near, compared to singleton (Wilcoxon signed rank test, z(71) = 4.00, p = 3.2 x 10-5), far (z(71) = 
3.18, p = 0.002), or mid (z(71) = 3.60, p = 1.6 x 10-4) flanker spacings.  
Because only monkey 1 was engaged in the discrimination task we wanted to be sure that 
these results were consistent across animals, so we repeated the previous analyses on each animal 
separately (Fig. 15E,F). Again, target selectivity significantly decreased with spacing for monkey 
1 (linear regression, F(38) = 7.1, p = 0.009) as well as for monkey 2 (linear regression, F(33) = 
14.3, p = 3.2 x 10-4). Likewise, the pairwise comparisons remained significant as well. For monkey 
1, selectivity was still significantly lower for near flankers compared to singletons (Wilcoxon 
signed rank, z(38) = 2.75, p = 0.003) and mid spacing flankers (z(38) = 2.15, p = 0.02). For far 
flankers the difference was borderline significant (z(38) = 1.51, p = 0.06). For monkey 2, 
selectivity was still significantly lower for near flankers compared singletons (Wilcoxon signed 
rank test, z(33) = 3.24, p = 6.0 x 10-4), mid flankers (z(33) = 2.18, p = 0.01), and far flankers (z(33) 
= 2.38, p = 0.008).   
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Figure 15. Experiment 1. Crowding reduces the strength of selectivity. A, Behavior on the discrimination task by 
monkey 1. B, Population firing rate responses to the preferred target averaged across both animals. C, Population 
responses to the non-preferred target averaged across both animals. D, Selectivity (difference in firing rate) between 
the best and worst targets averaged across both animals. E, The selectivity between best and worst targets for monkey 
1. F, Selectivity between best and worst targets for monkey 2. G, Empirical cumulative distribution function for 
latency of target selection across the population of neurons, as defined by the time the delta function (shown as an 
average over the whole population in D) reached half-height. H, Same as G except for using data from monkey 1 
only. I, Same as G except using data from monkey 2 only. 
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One of the advantages of neurophysiology is that not only do we get a glimpse of the fine-
grain selectivity between specific stimuli, but we also have access to the millisecond-level 
timecourse of that signal. This timecourse can reveal insights about the dynamic processes that 
lead to neuronal responses. Of particular interest in this context is the relationship between top-
down attention – the dynamic process of selecting a region of space to focus on – and crowding.  
When analyzing the latency of target selectivity across different flanker spacings we found 
a striking relationship between latency and the degree of crowding in the display (Fig. 15G-I). To 
avoid the confound with signal strength we defined latency as the time the selectivity curve reached 
half-maximum height. Across the population of neurons recorded from both monkeys, latency 
significantly increased as spacing decreased (linear regression, F(71) = 7.98, p = 0.005). Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that latency was greater for near flankers compared to far flankers 
(Wilcoxon signed rank test, z(71) = 2.80, p = 0.005) or singletons (z(71) = 4.18, p = 1.5 x 10-5). 
There was a trend toward significance for mid spacing flankers (z(71) = 1.34, p = 0.09).  
Again, we checked that the effect was present in both monkeys individually. For monkey 
1 the target selectivity signal arose significantly later for near flankers versus singletons (Wilcoxon 
signed rank test, z(38) = 2.63, p = 0.009) or far flankers (z(38) = 1.70,  p = 0.04). For monkey 2, 
there was a trend toward significance for near flankers versus singletons (Wilcoxon signed rank 
test, z(33) = 1.46, p = 0.07) and mid flankers (z(33) = 1.65,  p = 0.05).  
The finding that latency increases as flankers encroach on the target is consistent with an 
account of crowding that incorporates attention, but it does not rule out other interpretations. For 
instance, IT neuronal response latency is also increased by occlusion (Kosai et al., 2014) or the 
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addition of noise (Emadi and Esteky, 2013), and latency in early visual cortex is increased by 
surround suppression (M. A. Smith et al., 2006). 
3.3.1.3  Crowding Qualitatively Alters the Neuronal Code 
In the previous section, we defined neuronal preferences on the basis of neuronal 
preferences for targets in isolation. While we found that the singleton code was diminished as 
flankers grew near, we also don’t know at this point whether crowding qualitatively alters the 
neuronal code. Furthermore, although the previous section seemed to demonstrate crowding-
induced quantitative weakening of selectivity, all we really know is that the selectivity for 
singletons was diminished. This does not preclude the situation in which absolute selectivity 
between arrays remains static, or even increases. Based on the results so far, both the quantitative 
weakening and the qualitative change hypotheses are still in the running.  
To distinguish between these possibilities, we next defined neuronal preferences 
independently for each flanker spacing (Fig. 16) using a leave-one-out procedure to avoid bias (see 
Methods). Flanker proximity still had a significant effect on the magnitude of target selectivity in 
the combined data (linear regression, F(71) = 16.9, p = 0.001) as well as for both monkeys 
considered independently (linear regression, F(38) = 18.82, p  = 1.1 x 10-4 for monkey 1, and F(33) 
= 5.70, p = 0.02 for monkey 2). Post hoc pairwise comparison on the full data set revealed that 
neurons were significantly less selective between targets with nearby flankers compared to 
flankers at intermediate spacing (Wilcoxon signed rank test, z(71) = 1.78, p = 0.04), far spacing 
(Wilcoxon signed rank test, z(71) = 3.15, p = 8.2 x 10-4), and singletons (Wilcoxon signed rank 
test, z(71) = 3.17, p = 1.6 x 10-4). 
The same trend was present when considering the each monkey’s data separately 
(Wilcoxon signed rank test, z(38) = 1.70, p = 0.04), far spacing (z(38) = 2.51, p = 0.04), and 
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Figure 16. Experiment 1. Neuronal preferences determined separately within each spacing 
condition. A, combined across anomals. B, monkey 1. C, monkey 2. D, Latency distributions for 
combined data. E, monkey 1. F, monkey 2. Conventions the same as Fig. 15D-I. 
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singletons (z(38) = 2.80, p = 0.003). For monkey 2, post hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that 
selectivity was still significantly lower for targets surrounded by nearby flankers compared to far 
flankers (Wilcoxon signed rank test, z(33) = 1.72, p = 0.04) or singletons (z(33) = 2.00, p = 0.02). 
Overall, these findings provide continued support for the hypothesis that crowding quantitatively 
weakens the neuronal code. 
However, quantitative and qualitative changes are not mutually exclusive. Despite the 
persistent quantitative effect, selectivity for the most crowded targets was strikingly increased 
when preferences were defined separately within each spacing condition (compare Fig. 15D-F to 
Fig. 16A-C). For easier direct comparison with the singleton-based analysis, we computed the 
average firing rate difference between most and least preferred target letters at each flanker spacing 
for each neuron under both methods (Fig. 17). Selectivity was significantly greater for the within-
spacing-defined analysis for both the combined data (Wilcoxon signed rank test, z(71) = 3.39, p = 
3.5 x 10-4), as well as for each monkey considered separately (z(38) = 1.85, p = 0.03 for monkey 
1 and z(33) = 2.48, p = 0.007 for monkey 2). The finding that using crowded trials to define 
neuronal preferences significantly improved neuronal selectivity to crowded targets supports the 
hypothesis that crowding causes a qualitative change in the neuronal code.  
To be sure of the robustness of our latency results from the singleton-based analysis, we 
repeated that procedure on the within-spacing-based selectivity curves. Again, target selection 
occurred later when flankers were near the target compared to other spacings (Fig. 16D-F). This 
result was statistically significant for the combined data (Wilcoxon signed rank, z(71) = 2.37, p = 
0.009 for singtons, z(71) = 2.06, p = 0.02 for far flankers, and z(71) = 2.32, p = 0.02 for mid flanker 
spacing). 
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Figure 17. Experiment 1. Selectivity 
for target letter. A, Combined data 
across both monkeys. The solid line 
indicates mean firing rate difference 
between the most and least preferred 
targets when the preferences of each 
neuron were determined from 
singleton trials. Error bars indicate 
SEM. The dashed line indicates the 
mean selectivity when preference were 
defined separately within each spacing 
condition. Significant differences 
between the dashed and solid curves at 
each spacing are denoted by asterisks 
directly above each point. Significant 
differences between the singleton 
condition versus near-flanker 
selectivity are denoted by asterisks 
beside the vertical brackets, where the 
solid bracket corresponds to the 
singleton-defined preferences and the 
dashed bracket corresponds to the 
within-spacing-defined preferences. 
To examine the divergence between 
the two curves, we computed the 
difference between them and examined 
how it varied between spacings. In all 
cases, significant differences are 
denoted by * (Wilcoxon signed rank 
test, p < 0.05). In all cases, the 
statistical test was Wilcoxon signed 
rank with * denoting p < 0.05 and ** 
denoting p < 0.01. B, Monkey 1 data 
only. C, Monkey 2 data only.  
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For individual monkeys, the results were similar, but less statistically robust. For monkey 
1, latency was significantly greater for near flanker trials versus singletons (Wilcoxon signed rank, 
z(38) = 2.10, p = 0.02) and trending toward significance for mid spacing (z(38) = 1.54, p = 0.06) 
and far spacing (z(38) = 1.56, p = 0.06) flankers. For monkey 2, latency was significantly greater 
when flankers were near compared to all other conditions (Wilcoxon signed rank, z(33) = 2.11, p 
= 0.02 for singletons, z(33) = 1.78, p = 0.04 for far spacing, and z(33) = 1.92, p = 0.03 for mid 
spacing). 
Previously, all of our analyses have focused on the magnitude of neuronal selectivity, as 
measured by the difference between firing rates evoked by the most and least preferred stimuli, 
out of the possible four presented during each session. To better characterize the degree to which 
neurons were changing their target preferences as a function of crowding, we next considered how 
the responses to all four targets correlated across different flanker spacings. A relatively strong 
correlation between near-flanker (crowded) conditions and the other conditions would indicate 
conservation of the code and argue against a qualitative impact of crowding (Fig. 18). Importantly, 
we wanted to establish a ceiling against which to compare the correlations of interest, because 
what appears to be a “low” correlation across two spacings might actually be the largest correlation 
possible. To that end, we subdivided firing rates into even and odd trials so that we could calculate 
correlations within the same spacing (Fig. 18A-C, colored circles on main diagonal), which 
indicate the maximum possible correlation that any of the off-diagonal correlations could achieve.  
Since we were correlating across the population of neurons with naturally varying mean firing 
rates, we first z-scored the data so that spurious correlations wouldn’t arise simply from some 
neurons firing more than others in general.  
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Figure 18. Experiment 1. Target 
preference correlations across spacing. 
A, Combined data across monkeys. The 
color code is retained from previous 
figures. Correlations are computed by 
comparing even and odd trials and axes 
are labeled accordingly. Correlation 
strength (Spearman-Brown corrected) is 
denoted by circle diameter. Negative 
correlations are denoted by open circles. 
B, Monkey 1. Conventions as in A. C, 
Monkey 2. D, Correlation strength as a 
function of spacing. Error bars indicate 
95% confidence intervals. The dashed 
line indicates correlations between odd 
and even trials at the same spacing (i.e., 
the main diagonal in A). The solid line 
indicates the correlation between the 
singletons and the other spacings, 
averaged over the upper and lower 
triangles of the matrix. Significant 
differences between the correlation 
strength at a given spacing is denoted by 
* (Pearson correlation confidence 
intervals, p < 0.05) or ** (p < 0.01) 
directly above error bars. Significant 
differences between the singleton-
singleton correlations and the near-
singleton correlations are denoted by ** 
(Pearson correlation confidence 
intervals, p < 0.01) beside the vertical 
solid bracket. Significant differences 
between the singleton-singleton and 
near-near correlations are denoted by * 
(p < 0.05) beside the vertical dashed 
bracket.  The difference between the 
curves is compared across spacings using 
a bootstrap analysis with 1,000 
iterations. E, Monkey 1 data only. Same 
conventions as in D. F, Monkey 2 data 
only. 
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For both monkeys as well as in the combined data, the near-near correlation was 
significantly greater than the near-singleton correlation (95% confidence intervals; Fig. 18D-F, 
yellow points on dashed versus solid lines). This finding indicates that the neurons consistently 
signaled the identity of crowded targets, yet they used a different pattern of responses than when 
those same targets were presented in isolation.  
To get a sense for whether the crowded code was particularly deviated from the singleton 
code, we compared the spread between the two curves (dashed versus solid lines) as a function of 
flanker spacing. What we found was that for the combined data the spread was greater for near 
compared to either mid or far flankers (1,000 iteration bootstrap, p < 0.01; Fig. 18C). Both 
monkeys showed the same trend, albeit weaker, in their individual data (1,000 iteration bootstrap, 
p < 0.05; Fig. 18D,E).  
Overall, these results serve to bolster the notion that crowding qualitatively alters the 
pattern of neuronal responses across different targets. Together, these findings suggest that the 
detrimental effects of crowding on behavioral performance (Fig. 15A) were at least in part due to 
a confusion of the neuronal code and not solely due to divisive normalization. A firing rate pattern 
signifying one target in isolation could signify another as flankers crowd around. This is not only 
a novel task, but also a novel neuronal behavior.  
3.3.2 Experiment 2 
While the first experiment provided evidence that crowding qualitatively alters neuronal 
selectivity in IT, our experimental design was not equipped to determine exactly what that 
qualitative changes entailed. We designed experiment 2 explicitly for the purpose of decomposing 
selectivity into main effects from interaction effects. If the qualitative change was to manifest as a 
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main effect, that would mean that the mere presence of another stimulus disrupts the neuronal code 
for the target. If, on the other hand, the qualitative change was to manifest as an interaction effect, 
that would mean that the identity of the flanker influences the nature of the code change. We also 
included an additional control in the form of stimulus size. Since crowding is driven by the absolute 
spacing between peripheral stimuli, independent of their size, we wanted to be sure that any 
neuronal mechanism we may ascribe to crowding possesses this same property.   
3.3.2.1 Task and Stimuli Design  
To better understand the mechanism by which crowding disrupts neuronal preferences, we 
orthogonalized three variables: stimulus spacing, stimulus size, and stimulus pairing. This design 
allowed us to calculate the main and interaction effects between the stimuli and observe how they 
changed with spacing, size, and the method of main and interaction effect determination.  
Both animals were passively fixating while letter-like stimuli appeared in the contralateral 
visual hemifield (Fig. 19A). Each trial consisted of two alternating periods of fixation and passive 
viewing. The stimuli on the screen during the second passive viewing session were never the same 
as the first. The full set of all possible combinations of first and second stimuli were presented in 
random order throughout the session. These constraints aimed to minimize the effects of repetition 
suppression (McMahon and Olson, 2007) and perceptual learning (Miyashita, 1988) that could 
influence firing rates and introduce confounds. 
Stimuli were a combination of Sloan letters and Sloan-like letters designed in the lab, which 
we refer to collectively as “elements.” Each session involved a set of four elements, chosen from 
one of two separate sets (Fig. 19A,B). At most two of these elements were on the screen at any 
given time, with one located vertically above the other. The vertical arrangement was chosen 
because IT receptive fields are usually shaped like a 2D Gaussian distribution, overlapping the 
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fovea, and extending into the contralateral hemifield (Op De Beeck and Vogels, 2000). Vertically-
arranged elements are less likely to exit the receptive field as spacing increases, unlike 
horizontally-arranged elements.  The element pair was always presented at 6° eccentricity and 
vertically centered about the horizontal meridian. Two of the elements could appear on top and 
two could appear on bottom for a total of four possible pairings during a given session (Fig. 
19A,B). Each stimulus was also presented by itself at 6° eccentricity, situated on the horizontal 
meridian. We had two such sets of letter-like stimuli at our disposal, and the choice between them 
was dictated by the preferences of the neurons we happened to be recording from.  
The variables of interest were stimulus size, absolute center-to-center spacing between 
stimuli, and center-to-center spacing relative to size. We chose two letter sizes, 1° and 2°, as a 
compromise between the small letter sizes used in the crowding literature (as well as in our 
experiment 1) and the fact that the optimal stimulus size for IT neurons is 3.7° on average (Ito et 
al., 1995). The large element displays were identical to the small element displays except scaled 
up by a factor of 2 (Fig 19C). Inter-element spacings were chosen such that the smallest spacing 
for large elements was the same absolute center-to-center spacing as the largest spacing between 
small elements (2.2°).  
Altogether there were 40 unique conditions in a session. These conditions included all 
possible combinations of the four stimulus pairs, two stimulus sizes, and four spacings relative to 
size, as well as the four large and four small stimuli shown by themselves. Each condition was 
presented eight times to get a good estimate of mean firing rate for each neuron. Since two 
conditions were presented in a given trial, the animals only had to complete 160 trials total during 
a recording session. Successful trials were those in which the animal maintained fixation on the 
fixation point at the center of the screen throughout the entire trial duration (Fig. 19D).  
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Figure 19. Experiment 2 task and stimulus design. A, The top and bottom elements and all 
possible combinations for stimulus set 1. B, The top and bottom elements as well as all 
combinations for stimulus set 2. C, There were four possible spacings, two sizes, as well as 
singletons. The large letters were twice the size of the small letters. Spacings were chosen such 
that the nearest relative spacing for the large letters was the same absolute spacing as the farthest 
possible spacing for the small letters. D, The sequence of events during each trial. 
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3.3.2.2 Main Effects Change with Size-Relative Spacing 
We recorded 34 visually-responsive neurons from monkey 1 and 36 from monkey 2 while 
they performed the experiment 2 passive fixation task (Fig. 19). Because both monkeys performed 
the same task their data was combined in the figures, but we also repeated all tests separately for 
each monkey individually. The same trends generally persisted, with divergences noted where they 
appeared. 
First we computed the main effect of target identity (see Methods) for each spacing and 
element size (Fig. 20A,B). Similar to experiment 1, preferences used to align main effects across 
neurons were defined on the basis of singleton conditions (solid line) and then again within each 
spacing independently (dashed line). Because the design of this experiment produced a main effect 
of both top and bottom elements we averaged those together to arrive at a single main effect 
measurement at each spacing and size.  
We were interested in whether main effects underwent a qualitative change as spacing 
between elements decreased, and if so, whether this change was dependent upon relative or 
absolute spacing. So, for each spacing, size, and neuron we looked for differences in main effect 
strength across the two methods of preference designation (Fig. 20A,B, dashed versus solid line). 
For small elements, there was a significant difference between singleton-defined versus within-
spacing-defined main effects for near-spacing (Wilcoxon signed rank test, z(70) = 4.66, p = 3.2 x 
10-6), mid-near spacing (z(70) = 3.07, p = 0.002), and mid-far spacings (z(70) = 2.24, p = 0.02). 
For large elements, there was a significant difference for near-spacing (z(70) = 2.82, p = 0.005), 
mid-near-spacing (z(70) = 7.10, p = 1.2 x 10-12), and mid-far-spacings (z(70) = 3.99, p = 6.7 x 10-
5). Main effects appear to change qualitatively with the relative spacing between elements. 
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Figure 20. Experiment 2. Main and interaction effects change with spacing. A, Mean main effect averaged over 
the top and bottom elements for small elements as a function of spacing. Error bars indicate standard error of the 
mean. Solid line connects cases where singletons were used to define neuronal preferences. Dashed line connects 
cases where preferences were defined within each spacing separately. Gray lines indicate linear regression fit. B, 
Mean main effects for large elements. Conventions as in A. C, Interaction effect of small elements as a function 
of spacing. Solid line connects cases where preferences were defined from the far spacing trials. Dashed line 
connects the cases where preferences were defined separately within each spacing. D, Interaction effects for large 
elements. Conventions as in C. In all panels, significance is denoted with ** (p < 0.01) or * (p < 0.05).  Significant 
difference between the dashed and solid curves within a given spacing are denoted by asterisks directly above the 
error bars. Significant differences between dashed and solid lines across spacings are denoted by horizontal 
brackets. Significant differences between far- and near-element spacings for the wintin-defined conditions are 
denoted by vertical brackets. 
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When the data from each monkey was considered separately, the overall trend remained 
the same but many comparisons between the singleton-defined and within-spacing-defined main 
effect strength failed to reach statistical significance. For monkey 1 and small elements, mid-far-
spacing remained significant (Wilcoxon signed rank test, z(34) = 2.25, p = 0.02) and far spacing 
was trending toward significance (z(34) = 1.63, p = 0.10). For large elements the difference 
between the curves remained significant for near spacing (z(34) = 2.48, p = 0.01) and was trending 
toward significance for mid-near (z(34) = 1.51, p = 0.13) and mid-far spacings (z(34) = 1.44, p = 
0.15). For monkey 2 and small elements, the singleton-defined and within-spacing defined main 
effect strength was still highly significantly different for near (z(36) = 5.63, p = 1.8 x 10-8), mid- 
near (z(36) = 5.90, p = 3.5 x 10-9), and mid-far (z(36) = 4.14,  p = 3.5 x 10-5) spacings. For large 
elements, the singleton-defined and within-spacing-defined main effects remained significantly 
different for mid-near (z(36) = 6.60, p = 4.0 x 10-11) spacing, and was trending toward significance 
for mid-far spacing (Wilcoxon signed rank test, z(36) = 1.74, p = 0.08). 
Having shown that main effects undergo a qualitative change as relative inter-element 
spacing decreases, we wanted to see whether the magnitude of this change intensified as the 
elements drew nearer, as we observed with selectivity in experiment 1. The purpose here is to 
determine whether the widening gap for selectivity – which we attributed to crowding – is still 
present when we’ve pulled out only main effects and controlled for relative versus absolute 
spacing. For small elements, the qualitative change in main effect was significantly larger for near 
compared to either mid-far (Wilcoxon signed rank test, z(70) = 1.94, p = 0.03) or far spacing (z(70) 
= 1.72, p = 0.04) conditions. Mid-near also underwent a significantly larger qualitative change 
compared to far spacing conditions (z(70) = 2.43, p = 0.008; Fig. 20A). Large elements exhibited 
a similar pattern. The separation between the two curves was significantly larger for mid-near 
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(z(70) = 2.76, p = 0.003), mid-far (z(70) = 1.97, p = 0.02), and near-spacing (z(70) = 1.74, p = 
0.04) conditions compared to far spacing conditions (Fig. 20B). The qualitative change in main 
effects continues to mirror what we saw in experiment 1 for selectivity. Furthermore, it is relative 
rather than absolute spacing that drives the qualitative change in main effects. 
The same trend was present in both monkeys’ individual data, albeit not as statistically 
robust as in the combined data. For monkey 1, there was a significant width difference when 
comparing large elements at mid-near versus mid-far spacings (Wilcoxon signed rank test, z(34) 
= 1.78, p = 0.04) or when comparing small elements at near spacing versus mid-far (z(34) = 1.61, 
p = 0.05) and far (z(34) = 2.05, p = 0.02) spacings. For monkey 2, the curves were significantly 
more separated for small elements at near spacing compared to mid-near (Wilcoxon signed rank 
test, z(36) = 1.75, p = 0.04), mid-far (z(36) = 2.14, p = 0.02), and far (z(36) = 2.46, p = 0.007) 
spacings. For large elements, the curves became significantly wider between mid-near (Wilcoxon 
signed rank test, z(36) = 5.05, p = 4.5 x 10-7) and far (z(36) = 2.80, p = 0.005) spacings compared 
with far spacing.  
Because we saw such a pronounced impact of spacing on the latency of target selection 
during experiment 1, we were curious whether this effect persisted for the present experiment. If 
so, that would be an indication that the latency effect was driven by a bottom-up mechanism – 
because neither element in the experiment 2 pairings was more likely than the other to be a target 
of attention – and was not dependent on the number of items in the array. On the contrary, we did 
not find evidence for a connection between inter-element-spacing and main effect latency for 
experiment 2. When selectivity was determined separately for each spacing, the time to main effect 
half height across the population of neurons was not significantly affected by inter-element spacing 
for either small (linear regression, F(70) = 1.82, p = 0.18) or large (F(70) = 0.84, p = 0.36) 
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elements. When main effect preferences were determined from the singleton conditions, there was 
a slight trend toward longer latency with narrower spacing for small elements (F(70) = 3.25, p = 
0.07), but not for large elements (F(70) = 1.37, p = 0.24). There was also no significant latency 
effect for monkey 1 (singleton-defined: F(34) = 0.96, p = 0.33 for small elements and F(34) = 
1.78, p = 0.19 for large elements; within-spacing-defined: F(34) = 1.26, p = 0.27 for small 
elements, F(34) = 1.09, p = 0.30 for large elements) or monkey 2 (singleton-defined: F(36) = 0.47, 
p = 0.50 for small elements and F(36) = 0.09, p = 0.76 for large elements; within-spacing-defined: 
F(36) = 0.11, p = 0.74 for small elements, F(36) = 0.06, p = 0.80 for large elements). 
So far, the analyses we have presented for experiment 2 have considered large and small 
element conditions separately. Similar to experiment 1, we observed a qualitative change in main 
effects as inter-element spacing decreased in both cases. However, since the central question here 
is whether main effects constitute a neuronal correlate of the crowding phenomenon we must 
directly compare main effects at matched absolute and relative spacings. Since the degree of 
crowding is determined by eccentricity (which we kept constant here) and absolute center-to-
center spacing between stimuli regardless of stimulus size (Levi, 2008; Pelli et al., 2004), we 
expected that if crowding were manifest in main effects then the pattern of main effects would 
vary systematically as a function of absolute, not relative, spacing.  
First, we tested the effect of absolute spacing. To do this we called upon the pair of 
conditions in which absolute spacing was held constant while element size varied. When large 
elements were situated at the near spacing they had the same absolute spacing (2.2°) as when small 
elements were positioned at the far spacing (Fig. 19C). Comparing the within-spacing-defined 
main effects for these two conditions revealed no significant difference for either the combined 
data (Wilcoxon signed rank test, z(70) = 0.10, p = 0.46) or for either monkey individually (z(34) = 
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0.42, p = 0.74 for monkey 1 and z(36) = 1.22, p = 0.22 for monkey 2). When considering singleton-
defined main effects, a borderline significant difference emerged for the combined data (z(70) = 
1.47, p = 0.07) and monkey 2 (z(36) = 1.63, p = 0.10), but not for monkey 1 (z(34) = 0.56, p = 
0.58). The most striking evidence against absolute spacing, however, comes from the difference 
between the curves (Fig. 20A,B, compare the spread for far spacing with small elements to near 
spacing with large elements). There was a significantly greater difference for large elements 
spaced near one another compared to small elements spaced far apart (Wilcoxon signed rank test, 
z(70) = 2.60, p = 0.005). This was also true of the individual monkey data (z(34) = 1.97, p = 0.05 
for monkey 1, and z(36) = 2.45, p = 0.01 for monkey 2). 
Since absolute spacing did not appear to be the primary driver of the qualitative main effect 
change, we next turned to size-relative spacing. For this step, we were comparing more than just a 
single pair of conditions, so we performed an ANCOVA analysis to determine how the pattern of 
main effects changed as a function of scale. Essentially, we were asking whether the slope of the 
fit line (gray line in Fig. 20A) for small elements was different from the slope of the fit line for the 
large elements (gray line in Fig. 20B). We did this separately for both singleton-defined and 
within-spacing-defined main effects. In all cases, size had no significant impact on the pattern of 
results (F(70) = 0.28, p = 0.60 for singleton-defined main effects, and F(70) = 0.08, p = 0.78 for 
within-spacing-defined main effects). This held true for both monkey 1 (F(34) = 1.43, p = 0.24 for 
singleton-defined, and F(34) = 0.73, p = 0.40 for within-spacing-defined main effects) and for 
monkey 2 (F(36) = 0.35, p = 0.55 for singleton-defined, and F(36) = 0.02, p = 0.89 for within-
spacing-defined main effects). We take this as evidence that the qualitative change in main effects 
is a function of the relative spacing between elements, not absolute spacing. Therefore, we are 
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hard-pressed to claim that main effects are at the heart of the crowding phenomenon. Next, we 
turn to interaction effects as a potential candidate for the neuronal correlate of crowding. 
3.3.2.3 Interaction Effects Are Sensitive to Element Size 
As with the main effects, we calculated interaction effects for each spacing and for each 
element size. Rather than defining preferences on the basis of singletons, because that makes no 
sense for interactions, we used the size-relative far spacing trials as a point of comparison for the 
within-spacing analysis. The calculation of interaction effect strength is detailed in the Methods.  
As with main effects, there were no strong latency trends for the onset of interactions across 
the IT neuronal population. When selectivity was determined by singletons, the time to interaction 
effect half height across the population of neurons was not significantly affected by inter-element 
spacing for either large or small elements (linear regression, F(70) = 2.79, p = 0.10 for small 
elements, and F(70) = 0.43, p = 0.63 for large). Likewise, when selectivity was determined 
separately for each spacing neither small nor large elements exhibited a systematic change in 
interaction latency as a function of spacing (linear regression, F(70) = 0.17, p = 0.68 for small 
elements, and F(70) = 0.84, p = 0.36 for large). There was also no significant latency effect for 
monkey 1 (singleton-defined: F(34) = 0.48, p = 0.49 for small elements and F(34) = 0.03, p = 0.86 
for large elements; within-spacing-defined: F(34) = 2.10, p = 0.15 for small elements, F(34) = 
0.41, p = 0.52 for large elements) or monkey 2 (singleton-defined: F(36) = 0.08, p = 0.78 for small 
elements and F(36) = 1.65, p = 0.21 for large elements; within-spacing-defined: F(36) = 0.43, p = 
0.52 for small elements, F(36) = 2.35,  p = 0.13 for large elements). 
The first order of business was to determine whether qualitative changes in neuronal 
preferences were manifest in interaction effects. Indeed, this was what we observed for both small 
(Fig. 20C) and large (Fig. 20D) elements. Similar to main effects, interactions were larger when 
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defined on the basis of far-spacing conditions (compare dashed and solid lines). This relationship 
was significant for small elements at near spacing (Wilcoxon signed rank test, z(70) = 1.94, p = 
0.04), mid-near spacing (z(70) = 6.39, p = 1.7 x 10-10), and mid-far spacing (z(70) = 4.90, p = 9.6 
x 10-7). The same trend was present for large elements (Wilcoxon signed rank test, z(70) = 6.91, p 
= 4.8 x 10-12 for near, z(70) = 8.78, p = 1.7 x 10-18 for mid-near, and z(70) = 7.54, p = 4.5 x 10-14 
for mid-far spacing). Comparing the difference between the two methods across spacing, we saw 
that for both small and large elements the largest effect was evident for the mid-near element 
spacing. Compared to near-spacing conditions, mid-near-spacing interactions were significantly 
larger for both small (Wilcoxon signed rank test, z(70) = 6.37, p = 2.0 x 10-10) and large (z(70) = 
2.20, p = 0.03) elements. The non-monotonic relationship between the qualitative neuronal code 
change suggests that size-relative mid-range distances between elements are optimal for 
interactions, whereas the closest spacings may give way to interference.  
In contrast with main effects, however, interaction strength actually increased as spacing 
between elements decreased, but only for large elements (linear regression; F(70) = 7.59, p = 
0.008; Fig. 20D). That the pattern of results was different across sizes for interactions was 
intriguing because it suggested that perhaps interaction effects underlie crowding. To directly test 
how spacing impacted interaction strength across the two stimulus sizes, we compared the slopes 
of the linear regression fits (Fig. 20C,D, gray lines). What we found was that the slope of the fit 
lines was significantly different across stimulus sizes regardless of how interactions were defined 
(ANCOVA, F(70) = 26.17, p = 0.0003 for within-spacing-defined interactions, and F(70) = 15.6, 
p = 0.0005 for far-defined).  
This pattern was slightly different across monkeys. For monkey 1, the within-spacing-
defined interaction effects significantly decreased with spacing for small elements (linear 
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regression, F(34) = 4.44,  p = 0.04), but did not systematically vary for large elements (linear 
regression, F(34) = 1.15, p = 0.29). The difference in slope across size was still significant 
(ANCOVA, F(34) = 5.71, p = 0.02). For monkey 2, within-spacing-defined interactions did not 
vary across spacing for small elements (linear regression, F(36) = 0.009, p = 0.92), but for large 
elements there was a significant increase in interaction effect magnitude as spacing decreased 
(linear regression, F(36) = 4.39, p = 0.04). Again, there was a significant difference in slope across 
size (ANCOVA, F(36) = 6.21, p = 0.02). Therefore, in all cases interaction effects were not scale 
invariant. But to claim that crowding is manifest in interaction effects requires more than simply 
showing that it is not driven by relative spacing. We must show that absolute spacing is a better 
predictor.  
This is precisely what we found. Absolute interaction strength did not vary significantly 
when elements were at the same spacing, 2.2° apart (Wilcoxon signed rank test, z(70) = 0.98, p = 
0.33). This was true for both monkey 1 (z(34) = 0.56, p = 0.58) and monkey 2 (z(36) = 1.02, p = 
0.30). This finding supports the idea that interactions underlie the crowding phenomenon.  
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3.3.2.4  Swapping Preferences 
Main and interaction effects are informative, but also quite removed from the raw data. To 
gain intuition about what these effects mean for the neuronal code it’s often helpful to see what 
individual neurons are doing. For the population-level main and interaction effects to change with 
spacing, individual neurons should be flipping their preferences across spacings. That’s exactly 
what we saw (Fig. 21). 
When looking at the exact same element pair at both the near and far spacing it’s clear that 
the neuronal code is not static (Fig. 21). Whereas one element pair is preferred at one spacing (Fig. 
21A, compared dashed and solid lines), the other pair is preferred at a different spacing (Fig. 21B). 
In this example, the top element in the pair was held constant to demonstrate that the preference 
for the two bottom elements truly flipped, simply as the result of the proximity of the other element. 
For this neuron, the other top element did not generate such a preference flip (Fig. 21C,D). 
Therefore, this illustrates an example of a single neuron that underwent a qualitative interaction 
effect change (as seen by the specificity of the preference flip to a particular top element; compare 
Fig. 21A,B to Fig. 21C,D). 
Figure 21. Experiment 2. Example 
neuron showing flipping 
preferences as a function of spacing 
between small elements. A, Yellow 
indicates near spacing. Solid line 
denotes one element pair while the 
dashed line denotes another. B, Red 
indicates far spacing. The same line 
style conventions as in A. Notice 
that the solid line is above the 
dashed line in A whereas in B the 
dashed line is on top. C, The same 
neuron responding to the other two 
pairs of elements used in this 
experiment. Near spacing again 
denoted by yellow. D, Far spacing 
with the same element pairs as in 
panel C. Notice that the order of the 
dashed and solid lines (indicating 
specific element pair) is unchanged 
across panels C, and D. 
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3.3.2.5 Main Effects are Correlated across Size, Interactions are 
Not 
IT neurons are known to maintain rank order across isolated 
stimuli regardless of size (Ito et al., 1995). Even though population 
main effect strength was scale-invariant (Fig. 20A,B), without a 
directly comparing stimulus rank order across sizes we cannot say 
for certain that the precise neuronal code was the same for large and 
small elements. To get at this question, we performed a correlation 
analysis across size for each spacing condition (Fig. 22). Large and 
small main effects were significantly correlated at all size-relative 
spacings (Fig. 22A; Pearson correlation, 99% confidence intervals). 
The magnitude of these correlations was within or above the 
minimum 95% confidence interval for the correlation between odd 
and even trials at the same size and spacing (Fig. 22A, gray line), 
indicating that neuronal preference were fully conserved across 
size. When absolute spacing was kept constant but scale and relative 
spacing were different, the correlation was still significantly 
different from zero (Fig. 22A black bar; Pearson correlation, 95% 
confidence interval). When the data from each animal was analyzed 
separately the correlations remained significantly different from zero in monkey 1 (all spacings 
except near and mid, 95% confidence intervals) as well as monkey 2 (all spacings, 95% confidence 
intervals). These results reinforce the claim that main effects are scale-invariant.  
Figure 22. Experiment 2. 
Correlation across size. A, Main 
effect correlation between 
element sizes across the 
population of neurons. Error bars 
indicate 95% confidence 
intervals and ** denotes 
significance (p < 0.01). Gray line 
indicates the across-size 
minimum lower 95% confidence 
interval of the Spearman-Brown-
corrected correlation between 
odd and even trials at each 
spacing. B, Interaction effect 
correlations across size for the 
population of neurons. 
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Interaction effects exhibited a different pattern (Fig. 22B). The correlation between 
interaction effects across large and small elements at the same relative spacing were significantly 
different from zero only for mid-near (Pearson correlation, 95% confidence interval), and mid-far 
(99% confidence interval) spacings, and failed to reach significance for near or far spacings. When 
the data from the two monkeys were considered separately the same pattern was present, but 
weaker. For monkey 1, the mid-near and mid-far cross-size correlations were significantly greater 
than zero. For monkey 2 the mid-far cross-size correlation was the only one to reach statistical 
significance. Unlike main effects, scale did seem to matter for interactions. However, even though 
absolute spacing may be a better predictor of interaction effect strength (Fig. 20C,D), there was no 
significant correlation across size for conditions in which absolute spacing was held constant 
(Pearson correlation, 95% confidence interval; Fig. 22B, black bar). This contradiction highlights 
the importance of examining how stimulus rank order changes with experimental variables, rather 
than merely measuring overall effect strength and raises the question of whether crowding is 
expressed as interactions among elements in IT neuronal representations. 
3.3.3 Experiment 3 
Whereas experiment 2 was designed to pose the question of whether the qualitative change 
in the neuronal code observed under crowding is driven by main or interaction effects, experiment 
3 aims to explore how the different parts of crowded objects contribute to crowding. It could be 
that only the adjacent edges interact with one another or main effects of certain parts are 
suppressed. Alternatively, all the elements of crowded objects may get tossed together into a 
mixed-up jumble of alphabet soup. A secondary question pertains to whether interactions between 
parts depend on the nature of the parts themselves or the location of those parts in the visual field. 
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3.3.3.1 Task and Stimuli Design 
Since we are only interested in the 
interactions between parts of crowded 
stimuli, we chose a single center-to-center 
spacing (1.1°) which matches the most 
crowded conditions in experiments 1 and 2. 
As in experiment 2, pairs of stimuli were 
always vertically-positioned. Each 
compound stimulus within the pair was made 
up of two Sloan letters fused together along 
the line they mutually share (Fig. 23A,B). 
The aspect ratio of the Sloan letters was 
halved so that when the two letters came 
together to form a compound it could have an 
aspect ratio of one. Line thickness was kept 
constant across the letters and their shared 
boundary. Four Sloan letters were combined 
together in all possible permutations to make the set of four top compounds (Fig. 23A). Another 
four Sloan letters came together in all possible combinations to make the set of four bottom 
compounds (23B). Then the four top compounds and the four bottom compounds were combined 
in all possible ways to form the complete set of 16 conditions (Fig. 23C). Each condition was 
repeated eight times for a total of 128 trials per session. During each trial the animals fixated a 
Figure 23. Experiment 3 task and stimulus design. A, Top 
and bottom elements combine in all possible ways to create 
the top compound. B, Top and bottom elements combine in 
all possible ways to create the bottom compound. C, Top and 
bottom compounds combine in all possible ways to make the 
full stimulus set. D, Series of events during each trial. 
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central spot, a pair of compounds was flashed in the periphery, and a fluid reward was given if 
fixation was held throughout (Fig. 23D). 
To decouple stimulus identity from location on the screen we also showed the same set of 
compound stimuli flipped about the horizontal axis while recording from a subset of neurons. This 
is an important control because the pattern of main effects and interactions across the elements of 
the compounds could arise from the position of those particular elements in the display. By 
inverting the displays we should also invert any patterns that are due solely to stimulus identity, 
while keeping patterns attributable to retinotopic location the same. 
3.3.3.2 Non-Adjacent Elements Interact across Crowded Displays 
We recorded from 39 visually-responsive neurons from monkey 1 and 21 from monkey 2. 
Of those, 13 visually-responsive neurons from monkey 1 and 17 from monkey 2 were tested with 
both the original stimuli as well as their vertical mirror images.  
The goal of this experiment was to determine how main and interaction effects vary across 
different parts of crowed displays and whether any pattern that might emerge was a result of 
position in the array versus the parts themselves. We could compute a main effect for each of the 
four positions by computing the difference between the preferred and non-preferred letter 
occupying that part of the stimulus. This is the same procedure that we adopted previously (see 
Methods). Likewise, the six possible pairwise interactions between each of the four parts of the 
arrays could be computed using the same recipe as before (see Methods). To determine whether 
the measured strengths were greater than expected by chance we performed a bootstrap analysis 
where we shuffled the trial labels for each neuron and computed the main and interaction effects 
on this shuffled data. We repeated this process 1,000 times and took the average across neurons 
for each run. Then we calculated the 95% and 99% percentiles of this shuffled data and compared 
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those values to the real mean main and interaction effects across neurons to determine whether 
these effects were significantly stronger than what would occur by chance. 
Main effects were significantly greater than chance for all positions in the display during 
both the original experiment (Fig. 24A; bootstrap, p < 0.01) and its vertical mirror inversion (Fig. 
24B; bootstrap, p < 0.01). Likewise, interaction effects, were greater than expected by chance 
across all parts of the display for both the original (Fig. 24A; bootstrap, p < 0.01) and inverted 
(Fig. 24B; bootstrap p < 0.01) experiments. Therefore, we may conclude that non-adjacent and 
non-connected parts of crowded objects interact and all parts of crowded displays contribute main 
effects. 
To directly examine the effect of part location on main and interaction effect magnitude, 
we turned to the sub-population of 30 neurons that were recorded in the context of both 
experiments. First, to examine whether the pattern of main effects varied as a function of letter 
Figure 24. Experiment 3. Non-adjacent interactions are tied to space. A, Main effects (circles) and interaction 
effects (curved lines) are shown as a function of the position of the element in the compound pair. Circle diameter 
indicates main effect strength and line thickness indicates interaction effect strength. B, Main and interaction effects 
for the vertically inverted stimuli. Conventions as in A. Significance was determined from a bootstrap analysis in 
which firing rates for all neurons were shuffled 1,000 times and mean interaction and main effects across the 
population were calculated on each iteration to get a null distribution. The 95th and 99th percentiles were used as 
cutoffs for * and ** designations, respectively. 
A B
1.0 Hz 2.0 Hz1.5 Hz
**
**
***
**
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**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
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**
**
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position in the array or whether the arrays were presented in either their original configuration or 
as vertical mirror images of those displays, we set up a nonparametric two-way ANOVA with four 
levels for the factor representing letter position and two levels for the factor representing vertical 
mirror images. We found no significant difference of main effect strength either as a function of 
letter position (two-way repeated measures ANOVA, F(30) = 0.25, p = 0.84) or vertical mirror 
images (two-way repeated measures ANOVA, F(30) = 0.72, p = 0.40). There was also no 
significant interaction effect between letter position and vertical mirror inversion (two-way 
repeated measures ANOVA, F(30) = 0.26, p = 0.86). 
Considering the monkeys independently did not alter the results. For monkey 1, main effect 
strength was the same at all positions in the array (two-way repeated measures ANOVA, F(13) = 
1.24, p = 0.27) and was not significantly affected by vertical mirror inversion of the entire display 
(two-way repeated measures ANOVA, F(13) = 0.10, p = 0.76). There was also no significant 
interaction effect between letter position and vertical mirror inversion (two-way repeated measures 
ANOVA, F(13) = 0.78, p = 0.52). Similarly for monkey 2, main effect was not significantly 
modulated by letter position (two-way repeated measures ANOVA, F(17) = 0.64, p = 0.59) or 
vertical mirror images (two-way repeated measures ANOVA, F(17) = 1.33, p = 0.27). There was 
also no significant interaction effect between letter position and vertical mirror inversion (two-way 
repeated measures ANOVA, F(17) = 0.28, p = 0.84).  
As with main effects we can ask whether interaction effects were sensitive to the relative 
position between pairs in the array or vertically flipping the whole array. The factor representing 
pair distance had six levels, corresponding to the six possible pairwise interactions. The factor 
representing vertical mirror flips again had two levels. As with main effects, there were no 
significant impact of either the distance between parts (two-way repeated measures ANOVA, 
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F(30) = 0.25, p = 0.94) or vertical mirror inversion (two-way repeated measures ANOVA, F(30) 
= 1.29, p =0.27) on interaction effect strength. There was also no significant interaction effect 
between pairwise position and vertical mirror inversion (two-way repeated measures ANOVA, 
F(30) = 0.78, p = 0.61). What this tells us is that the relative locations of parts within crowded 
displays do not affect the strength of main and interaction effects in IT neuronal populations.  
Again, the pattern of results was not different when the two monkeys were considered 
independently. For monkey 1, there was no significant effect of distance between parts on the 
strength of their interaction (two-way repeated measures ANOVA, F(13) = 0.75, p = 0.59). Neither 
was there a significant effect of vertical mirror inversion (two-way repeated measures ANOVA, 
F(13) = 0.027, p = 0.87). Likewise, there was no significant interaction between part distance and 
mirror inversion (two-way repeated measures ANOVA, F(13) = 1.36, p = 0.25). When considering 
monkey 2 alone, the pattern remained the same. Distance between parts did not modulate 
interaction strength (two-way repeated measures ANOVA, F(17) = 0.48, p = 0.79). Vertical mirror 
inversion also had no significant impact on interaction effects (two-way repeated measures 
ANOVA, F(17) = 1.62, p = 0.22). Finally, there was no significant interaction between pairwise 
distance and mirror inversion (two-way repeated measures ANOVA, F(17) = 0.77, p = 0.58). 
Overall, these results indicate that object parts within crowded displays interact 
promiscuously with all other parts in the display. This effect was not specific to particular stimuli 
falling at particular retinotopic locations because inverting displays did not significantly alter the 
results. Thus, all the parts contribute to the jumbled percept characteristic of crowding. 
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3.4 DISCUSSION 
We have carried out three complimentary experiments in macaque monkeys to determine 
how visual crowding affects neuronal object representations. The key findings are as follows. First, 
as the space between stimuli decreased, neuronal selectivity for target letters both weakened 
quantitatively and changed qualitatively (Fig. 17). A second experiment demonstrated that this 
qualitative change can be captured in terms of both main (Fig. 20A,B) and interaction effects (Fig. 
20C,D), however only interactions followed the size-invariance characteristic of crowding. The 
strength of interaction effects increased as the absolute spacing between elements decreased and 
then plateaued. Main effects, on the other hand, were driven by relative spacing between elements. 
A third experiment revealed that all parts of the stimuli within crowded arrays interact (Fig. 24). 
These findings are the first to demonstrate how crowding alters object representations at the single 
neuron level. 
3.4.1 Distinguishing between Models of Crowding 
These results enable us to test the many competing models of crowding. One popular 
account of crowding is that signals about closely-spaced peripheral stimuli are averaged together 
(Parkes et al., 2001). This averaging could easily be instantiated in neuronal populations by 
summing feedforward inputs across the relatively large receptive fields found in higher levels of 
the ventral stream (van den Berg et al., 2010). We did observe a weakening in the strength of 
selectivity as a function of crowding (Fig. 16, 20A), but the qualitative changes we observed in 
the neuronal code indicate that averaging isn’t the whole story (Figs. 17,18, and 20).  
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Another popular account of crowding is that peripheral clutter is encoded as texture (Balas 
et al., 2009; Freeman and E. P. Simoncelli, 2011). Intuitively, one can imagine texture, as well as 
crowded arrays, as “hav[ing] lost form without losing crispness” (Lettvin, 1976). Given this 
definition, it’s no surprise that IT  an area concerned with form representation  is weakly 
selective between textures compared to V4 (Rust and Dicarlo, 2010) or V2 (Freeman et al., 2013; 
Ziemba et al., 2016). If crowded arrays were perceived as texture then we should have observed a 
weakening of target selection strength, which indeed we did (Fig. 17). But again, the more 
profound and surprising result we showed was a qualitative change in neuronal preferences. 
Because no prior neurophysiology study has directly compared the pattern of firing rates evoked 
by objects to that of their texturized versions (Portilla and E. Simoncelli, 2000) it is not possible 
to say whether textures would produce the kind of qualitative change in the neuronal code that we 
observed between crowded and uncrowded displays. As such, we cannot rule out the idea that 
crowded stimuli are represented as textures. Moreover, our finding that all parts of crowded arrays 
interact (Fig. 24) seems to support this idea. 
Yet another model of crowding centers on attention (He et al., 1996). The idea is that 
crowding arises when the attentional spotlight is no longer able to isolate a single stimulus 
(Cavanagh et al., 1999). The recent finding that the N1 EEG component inversely correlates with 
performance during a crowding task supports this assertion (Herzog et al., 2015). Only one of our 
animals in one of our experiments was indisputably deploying attention during neuronal 
recordings, and the results were essentially the same for both animals, so we cannot make strong 
claims about the role of attention. However, the fact that qualitative neuronal preference changes 
occurred at absolute spacings beyond the reach of crowding (Fig. 20B) suggests that the brain can 
overcome code confusion, and thus there may not be an inescapable loss of bottom-up information, 
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as has been suggested by opponents of the attention hypothesis (Freeman and E. P. Simoncelli, 
2011). Another piece of evidence in favor of the attention hypothesis is the latent improvement in 
neuronal selectivity for crowded targets exhibited by both monkeys during experiment 1, in which 
they were trained to attend the target (Fig.15H,I and 16E,F). If crowding were due solely to feed-
forward information loss then no such improvement should have been observed. The target 
selection latency under crowded conditions is on par with what has been seen previously in IT 
during an attention task (Chelazzi et al., 1993).  
Finally, crowding has been considered to result from feature mislocalization (Wolford and 
Shum, 1980) or substitution of a flanker for a target (Freeman et al., 2012). Conceptually, this 
model has been described as features becoming unglued from space (Pelli and Tillman, 2008). Our 
main finding that the neuronal code changed qualitatively between crowded and uncrowded 
displays generally supports this model. Feature recombination could seemingly flip a neuron’s 
preference from one stimulus to another (Fig. 21). The fact that interactions occurred across all 
parts of crowded arrays regardless of which part was where (Fig. 24) also lends support for this 
model because it relies on a system in which features are pooled across space with equal weight 
(Wolford, 1975). 
At first blush it may appear that our results do not come down strongly either in favor of 
or against any of these theories, and in fact this is an endemic problem that has plagued the field 
of crowding since its infancy. Despite recent attempts to find a grand unifying theory of crowding 
(Harrison and Bex, 2015; Keshvari and Rosenholtz, 2016), it has been called into question whether 
this quest is misguided (Agaoglu and Chung, 2016). Pitting the competing models against each 
other, Agaoglu and Chung found that none alone was sufficient to explain the entire crowding 
phenomenon. Throughout the course of our own study, using the novel approach of 
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neurophysiology, we have reached essentially the same conclusion. Crowding has proven to be far 
too complex a phenomenon to be captured by any of the existing models. 
3.4.2 Size Invariance 
While the qualitative change we observed for crowded conditions in experiment 1 seemed 
to be a reasonable neuronal correlate of crowding (Fig. 17), the lack of size invariance of this effect 
in experiment 2 (Fig. 20A-D) raised a few concerns. Size invariance is, after all, considered one 
of the hallmarks of crowding (Pelli et al., 2004). In the previous section, we interpreted these 
results as support for the attention hypothesis of crowding because presumably the large letters 
with narrow spacing were above the reach of crowding, so attention should be able to overcome 
the qualitative changes in main and interaction effects. Without behavior we cannot say this for 
certain, but the lack of an effect of spacing on latency as well as the equal status of elements as 
targets argues that attention is not being deployed during this task. 
An alternative interpretation of these results is that the qualitative change in main and 
interaction effects is not a neuronal correlate of crowding after all. Instead, it could simply be a 
general feature of object representation. Previous investigations of multiple objects or multiple 
object parts in IT have not reported the breakdown of divisive normalization that we saw as a 
function of spacing (Sripati and Olson, 2010a; Zoccolan et al., 2005), but this is also the first study 
to systematically vary the distance between a variety of peripheral stimuli. Perhaps what we 
observed in experiment 2 is simply a new manifestation of scale invariance, which is a well-known 
characteristic of IT neurons (Ito et al., 1995). It’s possible that the two-element displays in 
experiment 2 were interpreted by the animals as a single object, scaled up or down across 
conditions.  
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Interaction effects also reflected the qualitative preference change, and much more in line 
with the behavioral characterization of crowding we did observe differences across scale (Fig. 
22B). Like crowding, absolute spacing seemed to dictate within-spacing defined interaction 
strength, which sharply increased and then plateaued as absolute spacing decreased (Fig. 20C-D), 
although this plateau occurred at a much larger spacing than what we observed previously in 
behavior (Crowder and Olson, 2015)(Fig. 15A). There are two possible explanations that make 
this incongruence less damning. First, given that the task design was different between the first 
two experiments, it could be the case that the critical spacing over which crowding operates is 
much larger than in the original experiment. In line with this thought is the finding that using fewer 
flankers increased critical spacing (Banks et al., 1979). Second, because monkeys were not 
deploying attention during the second experiment, this might have had the effect of making critical 
spacing appear larger, just as attention has been said to “shrink” receptive fields (Rolls et al., 2003). 
However, without a behavioral readout on this task we can only speculate about the link between 
interaction effects and crowding.   
3.4.3 Limitations and Future Directions 
Although we uncovered some novel and surprising results, the present study is not without 
caveats. First, there are many different versions of behavioral tasks designed to show the crowding 
phenomenon and just as much variance in the findings, so our results may well not generalize. 
Some researchers use oriented gratings (Anderson et al., 2012; He et al., 1996; Parkes et al., 2001), 
others oriented letters (Flom et al., 1963a; Harrison and Bex, 2015; Tripathy and Cavanagh, 2002), 
and still others used upright letters of the English (Bouma, 1970) or Armenian (Freeman and Pelli, 
2007) alphabets. Some labs measured crowding in terms of threshold contrast (Pelli et al., 2004; 
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Strasburger et al., 1991), whereas others relied on the psychometric curve (Chung, 2007; Tripathy 
and Cavanagh, 2002; Yeshurun and Rashal, 2010). Based on the observation that crowding occurs 
across visual domains such as orientation, hue, and saturation (van den Berg et al., 2007) so long 
as flankers and targets are similar (Põder, 2007), we developed a task for nonhuman primates (Fig. 
14) that should meet the criteria for crowding. However, experiment 1 in the present study is 
admittedly limited in scope compared to the vast variations of past studies. 
Our first goal with creating a crowding task for nonhuman primates was that the behavior 
had to resemble that of humans (Crowder and Olson, 2015) and it must also facilitate neuronal 
recordings in IT. This balance between relevance to the human crowding literature as well as 
practical considerations inherent in finding selective neurons, compounded by the fact that no one 
has attempted to study crowding in an awake behaving monkey before, meant that the data from 
experiment 1 were too complex to draw strong conclusions from on its own.  
A subsequent, much simpler task (Fig. 19) was developed to address this concern; however, 
this task lacked behavior. It was an omission that proved problematic when it came time to 
understand the size invariance of the qualitative neuronal code change (Fig. 20A,B, Fig. 22A), 
precise absolute spacing effects for interactions, and most glaringly, how these neuronal findings 
relate to attention. To a human observer it is clear that the large letters with narrow spacing are 
discriminable in the periphery, and while the same is probably true of monkeys (Crowder and 
Olson, 2015), we have no direct evidence in this specific experiment. Also, because the number of 
distractors varied between experiments 1 and 2 we cannot say for sure whether critical spacing 
was the same, especially in light of evidence that distractor numerosity has been shown to reduce 
critical spacing (Banks et al., 1979). 
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Another limitation of our study is that we designed experiments 2 and 3 to be amenable to 
main and interaction effect measurements, which we expected to be telling. In fact, their 
modulation with relative spacing and tenuous connection with absolute spacing proved to be 
confusing. Future investigations into the neurophysiological basis of crowding should strive to 
attack the hypotheses we outlined in the previous section head-on so as to eliminate the ones that 
still remain standing. In particular, it would be interesting to investigate how texture derived from 
objects (Portilla and E. Simoncelli, 2000) is encoded in both peripheral and foveal vision compared 
to the original objects. Another potential avenue would be an explicit exploration of the feature 
mislocalization hypothesis of crowding (Wolford, 1975). One could record neuronal responses 
while requiring animals to report the object-relative location of features or report the identity of 
the letter in the center of an array made up of targets and distractors drawn from the same pool.  
Finally, our study didn’t touch one of the most striking and neglected characteristics of 
crowding, which is the radial-tangential anisotropy of crowding zones (Toet and Levi, 1992). 
These elliptical zones have an uncanny resemblance to saccadic eye movement endpoint scatter 
(Harrison et al., 2013; Nandy and Tjan, 2012), which also ties into the attention hypothesis of 
crowding by virtue of the fact that the same brain structures, such as the Frontal Eye Field (FEF), 
that command saccades also direct spatial attention (Moore, 2003).  FEF and IT have strong 
reciprocal connections (Schall et al., 1995), and inactivating FEF reduces IT neuronal selectivity 
for peripheral objects falling in the lesion site (Monosov et al., 2011), so it would be interesting to 
see how either sub-threshold stimulation or inactivation of FEF would affect IT neuronal responses 
to crowded displays. 
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3.4.4 Conclusions 
This work constitutes the first investigation into the neuronal mechanisms of visual 
crowding in a nonhuman primate. As the last four decades of crowding research have generally 
gone, we found the neuronal data to be more puzzling and strange than we ever imagined. 
Crowding is not  merely the reduction in strength of neuronal selectivity for the target object. 
Instead, the preferences of IT neurons changed qualitatively while preserving a good portion of 
the selectivity between crowded arrays. Just as with subjective experience, crowded letters don’t 
fade or disappear, but rather they transform. We take this as support for models that explain 
crowding as a devolution of objects into texture (Rosenholtz et al., 2012) or as mislocalization of 
object features (Strasburger and Malania, 2013). The latency of target selectivity under crowded 
conditions suggests that what sets the limit on peripheral resolution is not bottom-up pooling, but 
rather top-down attention. Having taken this first step toward finding a neuronal correlate of 
crowding, future work may address models of crowding at the single neuron level more directly.  
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4.0  INFEROTEMPORAL NEURONS BREAK THE LAW OF SIMPLICITY 
The visual system is tasked with the tricky job of taking in sometimes ambiguous 
information and constructing an internal representation that enables some degree of understanding. 
One way in which the brain might achieve this is to invoke the Gestalt law of simplicity, which 
states that the visual system interprets input with from the simplest possible explanation. A classic 
example of the law of simplicity in action is the case of overlapping shape outlines. The natural 
tendency is to perceive this composite figure as the set of shapes originally used to construct it, 
but there are many other possible — albeit more complicated — interpretations. We hypothesized 
that monkey inferotemporal cortex neurons would also decompose such composite figures into 
their natural constituents. What we found, however, was exactly the opposite. The neuronal 
representation most resembling the composite figure was actually the external contour, tracing the 
overall footprint of the composite figure. This effect was especially true early in the stimulus 
presentation period. We interpret this finding as more support for the global advantage effect, and 
argue against an inferotemporal object code based on the law of simplicity. 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Any theory of perception must deal with the basic fact that two-dimesional projections onto 
the retina permit many alternative interpretations. Therefore, the visual system must impose its 
own constraints to allow for the convergence on a single explanation for what the eyes are taking 
in. One such constraint is known as the law of simplicity, which lies at the heart of the Gestalt 
school of perceptual organization (Wertheimer, 1923).  
Simplicity hinges on the belief that the visual system interprets its available information 
with the simplest explanation possible. For instance, it’s simpler to imagine that a horse occluded 
by a tree is a single, whole animal rather than two half-animals. The law of simplicity is 
conjectured to underlie all other laws of perceptual organization (Wertheimer, 1923). From the 
very beginning, the simplicity  principle  was  put forward in opposition to the likelihood principle 
suggested earlier by Helmholtz, which has persisted as the predominant competing theory. 
Helmholtz’s likelihood principle suggests that the visual system interprets input as being derived 
not from the simplest interpretation, but from the most likely, based on prior experience (1925). 
Returning to the horse in the forest example, this theory states that the tree is considered an 
occluder and the horse considered whole because that’s far more likely than any alternative 
interpretation. Given this rather mundane example, both likelihood and simplicity are congruent, 
but what happens when we decouple them such that the simplest interpretation is unlikely? 
Leeuwenberg and Boselie proposed such a Gedankenexperiment by constructing the silhouette of 
a horse with a head on both ends (1988). The most likely interpretation is that there are two horses 
standing side by side facing opposite directions. The simplest interpretation, however, is that this 
is a strange animal with two heads, by virtue of symmetric information being redundant. This 
example seems to demonstrate that because likelihood and simplicity give rise to different 
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predictions they cannot be reconciled. However, at the level of theory they converge (Chater, 
1996). 
Likelihood is best and most commonly described within a Bayesian framework. Bayes’ 
rule takes in the prior probabilities of various scenarios as well as the current observations and 
spits out the most likely interpretation of these data (Bayes et al., 1763). Even though there is no 
explicit penalty for complexity, Bayes’ rule tends to favor simpler interpretations of the data 
(MacKay, 1992). Coming from the other side, structural information theory (SIT) is explicitly built 
upon the Gestalt principle of simplicity (Pomerantz and Kubovy, 1986), yet as a side-effect it 
exhibits the veridicality of stimulus identity that is characteristic of the likelihood model 
(Wagemans et al., 2012). Bayes rule and SIT can even be shown to be mathematically equivalent 
(Chater, 1996). So even though simplicity arose as a reaction to the likelihood hypothesis, these 
two models of perception are not mutually exclusive and may even be interdependent. How then 
does one explain the two-headed horse (Leeuwenberg and Boselie, 1988)? Even though such an 
animal is unlikely to occur based on raw frequency of sightings, the lack of depth and boundary 
cues do suggest the likelihood that this is one continuous object (Chater, 1996). However, this 
argument is purely theoretical and the empirical evidence to settle the debate is still lacking. 
Many studies have found evidence for various gestalt laws subsidiary to simplicity, such 
as grouping, illusory contours, common fate, similarity, and “seeing the forest before the trees” 
(Bona et al., 2014; Lee and Nguyen, 2001; Martin and Heydt, 2015; Sáry et al., 2007; Sripati and 
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Olson, 2009; Wannig et al., 2011; Zaretskaya et al., 2013; 
Zhou et al., 2000), but none have explicitly tested the 
neuronal basis for the law of simplicity. 
To tackle this mother of all Gestalt laws head-on we 
chose to leverage the problem that inspired the SIT model in 
the first place (Pomerantz and Kubovy, 1986). When shape 
outlines overlap the composite (Fig. 25A, yellow) humans 
still tend to perceive the “natural” parts used to construct it 
in the first place (Metzger, 1936). However, this is not the 
only possible interpretation. One can also imagine 
decomposing this composite figure into the “unnatural” parts 
typically hidden from conscious perception (Fig. 25, blue).  
Since neurons in IT tend to track conscious visual 
perception while subjects view and report on bistable stimuli 
(Sheinberg and Logothetis, 1997), we hypothesized that 
these neurons might also preferentially encode the natural parts of compound stimuli, and thus 
following the law of simplicity. We tested this by comparing the responses to each part and set of 
parts against the response to the composite. What we found was quite the opposite. The 
representation most resembling the composite was actually the external contour, tracing the global 
footprint of the composite (Sripati and Olson, 2010b), especially early in the trial. We take this as 
more support for the global advantage effect (Sripati and Olson, 2009), and argue against an 
inferotemporal object code based on the law of simplicity.   
Figure 25. The law of simplicity. There 
is a natural tendency to interpret  a 
composite figure made of overlapping 
shapes (yellow) as a collection of the 
“natural” parts used to construct it (red). 
However, there are other possible 
interpretations, which involve 
decomposing the composite into 
“unnatural” parts (blue). The tendency to 
perceive natural parts and overlook 
unnatural parts is evidence for the Gestalt 
law of simplicity. 
“natural” parts
“unnatural” parts
composite
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4.2 MATERIALS AND METHODS 
4.2.1 Animals and Equipment 
Two adult male rhesus macaque monkeys (Macaca mulatta) were used in these 
experiments (monkey 1 and monkey 2). Experimental procedures were approved by the Carnegie 
Mellon University Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee and were in compliance with the 
United States Public Health Service Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals. Before 
the recording period, each monkey was surgically fitted with a cranial implant and headpost (Crist 
Instrument). After initial training, a 2 cm-diameter vertically oriented cylindrical recording 
chamber (Crist) was implanted over the left hemisphere in both monkeys. In both animals, MRI 
brain scans were used to position the chamber mediolaterally above the superior temporal sulcus 
and rostrocaudally above anterior medial temporal sulcus. 
For behavioral testing, each monkey was seated in a primate chair with the head stabilized 
using the headpost. Events during each trial were controlled by Cortex software (NIMH). Visual 
stimuli were presented on a 17” LCD screen with 1024 x 768 pixels of resolution positioned 18” 
from the animal’s eyes. The precise time at which images appeared on the screen was recorded 
using a photodetector circuit (designed by NIMH and built in-house). Eye position was tracked by 
an infrared system (ISCAN). The system was calibrated by requiring the monkey, at the beginning 
of each block of trials, to fixate a small target presented successively at four locations 
corresponding to the corners of a 14° x 14° square centered on the screen. Offline, the readings on 
each trial were converted to degrees of visual angle by performing a linear transformation based 
on the stored calibration voltages. 
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Each day’s recording session would begin with the insertion of a varnish-coated tungsten 
microelectrode with an initial impedance of 1.0 M  at 1 kHz (FHC) into the temporal lobe through 
a transdural guide tube advanced using a hydraulic microdrive (Narishige). When mapping a new 
track electrodes were lowered to a depth such that its tip was 10 mm above the superior temporal 
sulcus, as estimated from MRI images of each animal’s brain. Using a grid inside the chamber 
with 1mm spacing between holes (Crist) the electrode could be advanced reproducibly along the 
same tracks day to day. The action potentials of a single neuron were isolated online by means of 
a commercially available spike-sorting system (Plexon). All waveforms were recorded during the 
experiments and final spike sorting was performed manually offline. 
Neurons were probed first with a set of 32 colorful photographs of objects to see whether 
they were visually-responsive. If so, they were further tested with the four composite stimuli (Fig. 
26A, yellow shapes), which ensure that neurons and stimuli were selected in a way that remained 
agnostic to experimental questions. Stimuli were chosen to maximize both mean firing rate. The 
composite that elicited the highest firing rate was chosen, along with all of its constituent parts 
(Fig 26A). 
4.2.2 Task and Training 
Monkeys were trained to maintain fixation within a 2° by 2° window around a central 
fixation point while shapes flashed on the screen at 2° eccentricity in the right visual hemifield. 
After fixating for 200ms a stimulus appeared for 200ms, followed by a 500ms gap (Fig. 26B). If 
fixation was maintained throughout the stimulus period the animals received a small juice reward 
and were allowed to look around freely until the fixation spot reappeared. All stimuli were 
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presented in a pseudorandom order so that each would be shown 8 times. Incomplete trials were 
repeated later in the block.  
Compound stimuli were formed from two overlapping shape outlines, which together 
spanned 2.5° horizontally and 3.5° vertically (Fig. 26A, yellow). Then those compound stimuli 
were decomposed into all of the constituent closed parts possible, so as not to introduce closure as 
a confound. The parts could either be the ones that the compound was initially composed of, which 
we dubbed “natural” parts (Fig. 26A, red), whereas other parts were labeled “unnatural” (Fig. 26A, 
blue). The natural parts were always 2.5° by 2.5° across whereas the unnatural parts could vary in 
size. The first category of unnatural parts was made by bisecting the compound stimulus along the 
vertical axis where the constituent shapes intersect (Fig. 26A, leftmost blue). The second kind of 
unnatural decomposition was made by separating the external contour of the compound from the 
internal contour (Fig. 26A, rightmost blue). The key difference between the natural and unnatural 
part designations is that to get the natural parts from the compound one must invoke the gestalt 
law of simplicity, which states that people tend to interpret ambiguous or complex images as being 
composed of the simplest forms possible (Metzger, 1936). The natural parts are more simple by 
virtue of having fewer abrupt direction changes (i.e., corners) that the unnatural shapes. Parts were 
always presented at the same location on the screen as they appeared in the composite, which was 
intended to avoid any influence that spatial location of particular features may have on the neuronal 
responses. 
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200ms
200ms
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500ms
Figure 26. Passive fixation task. A, Four possible stimulus sets, each comprised of the composite (yellow) as well 
as its corresponding natural (red) and unnatural (blue) parts. B, Task sequence, which repeated with pseudorandom 
order until each shape had been presented 8 times. 
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4.2.3 Data Analysis 
Neurons were only considered for analysis if they fired at a significantly higher rate in the 
period 70 to 270 ms after stimulus onset compared to the baseline period, -100 to 50 ms. 
Significance was assessed using a Wilcoxon signed rank test with  = 0.05. Unless otherwise 
noted, this same epoch, 70 to 270ms after stimulus onset, was used for all analyses. 
Because the central question asks whether IT neurons encode composites as if they are 
made up of the natural parts, we need a way to measure how similar the population of neurons 
considers these images to be. To do this we measured the Euclidean distance between each pair of 
images in multidimensional neuronal activation space. The larger the distance, the less similar the 
population considers those images to be. The advantage of the neuronal activation space approach 
is that it gets around the issue of specific neuronal preferences and interrogates the population as 
a whole, much the way a downstream brain area might.  
Euclidean distance (ED) can be visualized in a time-varying, stimulus-aligned manner 
similar in spirit to a peristimulus time histogram (PSTHs). To do this, firing rates were first aligned 
to stimulus onset and then the ED between pairs of images was computed for each 5ms bin. 
Another way we visualized similarity between the stimuli was with multidimensional scaling, 
which finds a set of 2D coordinates for each stimulus such that the 2D distances are as close as 
possible to the distances measured in the full activation space. This was implemented with a built-
in function in MATLAB (mdscale) after first standardizing the firing rates into z-scores, as 
required by the model. The quality of this 2D representation was assessed as percent of total 
variance across the multidimensional space captured by the first two dimensions. This can be 
computed by dividing the sum of the eigenvalues for the first two dimensions into the sum of all 
the eigenvalues.  
  103 
Another way to examine similarity between stimulus representations is with a dendrogram. 
For this we used another built-in MATLAB function (linkage) to convert z-scored mean firing 
rates into hierarchical clusters and then another function (dendrogram) was used to visualize these 
clusters. A dendrogram consists of a hierarchical series of inverted U-shaped connectors between 
clusters. The shorter the U (dubbed cophenic distance), the closer the clusters. To determine 
whether a given dendrogram was a good representation of the actual similarity between neuronal 
representations, we computed the Pearson correlation between the cophenic distances in the tree 
and the actual distances in the full neuronal activation space (cophenet in MATLAB). Like any 
correlation, this value could vary from 0 (poor dendrogram) to 1 (perfect dendrogram).  
To assess the degree to which the firing rate of the composite reflected the sum of its 
various pairs of parts, we first computed the average firing rate of the composite for each neuron. 
Then we computed average firing rate for one part as well as the average firing rate evoked by its 
complement. If the whole is equal to the sum of the parts then these values for each neuron should 
lie close to the unity line, which we assessed using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test.  
We also examined the degree to which the composite representation resembled that of the 
parts at different epochs following visual stimulation. We defined three epochs on the basis of the 
ED versus time plots. Epoch 1 spanned 80 to 150ms. Epoch 2 spanned 150 to 270ms. Epoch 3 
spanned 270 to 300ms. The epochs were initially selected visually, but each was confirmed to 
reflect a significant difference between the ED for the outline of the composite and the ED of the 
other parts. Within each epoch, we computed z-scored mean firing rates of each neuron for each 
part and then calculated the correlation coefficient between those values and the z-scored mean 
firing rates evoked by the composite during the same epochs.  
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To completely rid our measures of distance in neuronal activation space from possible 
firing rate confounds, we also computed distance in terms of the angle between population firing 
rate vectors. Distance between two stimulus conditions could then be calculated as the shortest 
great circle path between the corresponding population vectors. We used the following equation: 
θ𝑖,𝑗 =  cos
−1(?̂?𝑖 ⋅ ?̂?𝑗)     Eq. 4 
where ?̂?𝑖 is the unit vector of the population firing rate for stimulus i, and ?̂?𝑗 is the unit vector of 
the population firing rate for stimulus j. The output, θ𝑖,𝑗, is the angular distance between the two 
population vectors, and it must lie within 0 to  radians. 
4.3 RESULTS 
We recorded 37 visually-responsive neurons from monkey 1 and 30 from monkey 2. The 
main question concerned whether the representation of the composite image more closely 
resembled that of the natural parts, which would indicate adherence to the law of simplicity. Our 
first major test was whether the average Euclidean distance in neuronal activation space between 
the natural parts and composite was smaller than the distance between the unnatural parts and the 
composite. This turned out not to be true (Fig. 27A). The distance between the neuronal 
representation of the composite and its constituent parts was not significantly different for natural 
versus unnatural decompositions either in the composite data (Wilcoxon signed rank, z(67) = 0.55, 
p = 0.58) or for monkey 1 (z(37) = 0.46, p = 0.73) or monkey 2 (z(30) = 0.02, p = 0.98) considered 
separately. 
Lacking evidence for the law of simplicity, we turned to the classic Gestalt adage that “the 
whole is different from the sum of the parts” (Koffka, 1935). We did observe this to be true for 
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both natural (Fig. 27B) and unnatural (Fig. 27C,D) parts, with significant deviation from the sum 
in all cases (Wilcoxon signed rank, z(67) = 5.89, p = 4.0 x 10-9 for natural parts,  z(67) = 6.34, p = 
2.3 x 10-10 for vertically bisected unnatural parts, and z(67) = 6.35, p = 2.2 x 10-10 for nested 
contours). Rather than the sum, the average of the individual part responses was not significantly 
different from the response to the whole, regardless of whether it was deconstructed into natural 
parts (Wilcoxon signed rank, z(67) = 0.68, p = 0.50), vertically-bisected unnatural parts (z(67) = 
0.14, p = 0.89), or nested contours (z(67) = 1.12, p = 0.26). This finding is in line with previous 
work using non-overlapping shapes (Sripati and Olson, 2010a; Zoccolan et al., 2005). 
The same trend was present when both monkeys were considered separately. For monkey 
1, the neuronal responses to the composite significantly deviated from the responses to the sum of 
any complementary set of parts (Wilcoxon signed rank, z(34) = 4.35, p = 1.4 x 10-5 for natural 
parts,  z(34) = 4.76, p = 1.9 x 10-6 for vertically bisected unnatural parts, and z(34) = 4.78, p = 1.7 
x 10-6 for nested contours). In contrast, the average was a much more reasonable model (Wilcoxon 
signed rank, z(34) = 1.12, p = 0.26 for natural parts,  z(34) = 1.03, p = 0.30 for vertically bisected 
unnatural parts, and z(34) = 0.13, p = 0.89 for nested contours). For monkey 2, the neuronal 
responses to the sum was still a poor model (Wilcoxon signed rank, z(30) = 4.02, p = 5.6 x 10-5 for 
natural parts,  z(30) = 4.23, p = 2.4 x 10-5 for vertically bisected unnatural parts, and z(30) = 4.17, 
p = 3.0 x 10-5 for nested contours). In contrast, the average was a much more reasonable model 
(Wilcoxon signed rank, z(30) = 0.26, p = 0.78 for natural parts,  z(30) = 1.09, p = 0.28 for vertically 
bisected unnatural parts, and z(30) = 1.49, p = 0.14 for nested contours). 
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Figure 27. Composites are no more represented as natural parts than unnatural parts. A, Average euclidean distance 
in neuronal activation space between the composite and natural (red) versus unnatural (blue) parts as a function of 
time since stimulus onset. B, The firing rates evoked by the composite are not equal to the sum of the responses to 
the natural parts. Filled circles indicate neurons whose firing rates significantly deviated from the dashed line 
representing a summation model (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p < 0.05). The percentage of significant neurons is 
indicated in the lower right corner. C, The same analysis as in B, except comparing the unnatural parts created by 
separating the composite into upper and lower components. D, The same analysis again except using the unnatural 
parts consisting of the external and internal contours.  
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Having ruled out simplicity as the guiding rule behind the inferotemporal shape code, we 
took a step back and asked how the response to each individual part compared to that of the whole.  
Using multidimensional scaling (see Methods) to render inter-object distances on a 2D plane, we 
saw that the composite was closest to the external contour in neuronal activation space (Fig. 28A). 
For monkey 1 considered alone, the results were virtually identical, with 68% varance explained 
by the reduced dimensions. For monkey 2, the composite was still closest to the external contour, 
but the natural shapes no longer appeared to be the next closest (61% of variance explained). 
Because collapsing the full 67-dimension neuronal activation space onto a 2D plane is 
bound to lose and distort information, we also analyzed the clustering in the full activation space 
using a dendrogram (see Methods). Just as before, the composite most closely clustered with the 
contour (Fig. 28B). The dendrogram representation correlated strongly with the distances between 
shapes in the full neuronal activation space (cophenic correlation, r = 0.73). When the data for the 
two monkeys was analyzed separately, monkey 1 again was nearly a carbon copy of the combined 
data (cophenic correlation = 0.58) while monkey 2 had some deviations in which parts clustered 
together (cophenic correlation = 0.78). Nevertheless, in both cases, the composite clustered most 
closely with the external contour. 
One possible explanation for this effect is that the composite and external contour may 
simply evoke higher mean firing rates compared to the other parts due to their relatively large size 
and overall number of photon emissions. However, that doesn’t seem to be the case because mean 
firing rate was not significantly different across conditions (Kruskal-Wallis test, H(67) = 3.93,  p 
= 0.69; Fig. 28C). The same was true for monkey 1 alone (H(37) = 3.92,  p = 0.69) as well as 
monkey 2 (H(30) = 1.15,  p = 0.98). 
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Overall, composites are encoded more like 
contours than any other part, but does this effect vary 
over time? The propensity to perceive global shape 
over local details (Navon, 1977) or for IT neurons to 
encode global shape first (Sripati and Olson, 2009) 
suggests that this might be the case. If so, we also 
want to know whether all the other parts are 
represented equally later in the trial. 
What we found is that the composite is 
indeed represented similarly to the contour in the 
early portion of the trial (Fig. 29A). During the first 
epoch, from 80 to 150ms after stimulus onset, the 
squared difference in mean firing rate between the 
composite and its contour was smaller than the mean 
squared firing rate difference between the composite 
and all the other parts (Wilcoxon signed rank test, 
z(67) = 2.53, p = 0.006). For the second epoch, from 
150 to 270ms after stimulus onset, the contour was 
actually significantly farther away in neuronal 
activation space than the other parts (Wilcoxon 
signed rank test, z(67) = 1.86, p = 0.03). For the 
third epoch, from 270 to 300ms, the system 
Figure 28. Composites more closely resemble the 
external contour than natural parts. A, Distance in 
neuronal activation space collapsed onto two-
dimensions using multidimensional scaling. The 
external contour (blue keyhole) is closest to the 
composite (yellow). B, Dendrogram showing the 
same result. C, The above results cannot be 
explained by mean firing rate because it is not 
significantly different across conditions.   
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oscillated back toward a contour-
heavy interpretation of the composite 
stimulus (Wilcoxon signed rank test, 
z(67) = 2.70, p = 0.004). 
When considering the data 
from monkey 1 alone, the results 
followed the same trend and the 
difference between the curves was 
significant for epoch 1 (Wilcoxon 
signed rank test, z(37) = 2.07, p = 
0.02), epoch 2 (Wilcoxon signed rank 
test, z(37) = 1.76, p = 0.04), and 
epoch 3 (Wilcoxon signed rank test, 
z(37) = 2.29, p = 0.01). For monkey 2 
alone the data again followed the 
same overall trend, but the effect was 
just shy of statistical significance for 
all epochs (Wilcoxon signed rank test, 
epoch 1: z(30) = 1.43, p = 0.08, epoch 
2:  z(30) = 0.91, p = 0.18,  epoch 3:  z(30) = 1.55, p = 0.06). 
To see whether particular parts matched the composite better than others during the 
different epochs, we computed the correlation coefficient between the z-scored firing rate evoked 
by each part and that of the composite (Fig. 29B). For the first epoch, only the external contour 
Figure 29. Composites resemble different parts over time. A, 
Euclidean distance as a function of the time after stimulus onset. The 
purple curve reflects distance between the composite while the green 
curve reflects the average distance between the composite and 
remaining parts. When the contour distance is less, the difference 
between the curves is highlighted in light purple. Likewise, when the 
distance is less for the remaining parts the area between the curves is 
highlighted in light green. Significant differences between the 
curves, pooled over shaded regions, are denoted with ** (p < 0.01). 
B, The correlation between z-scored firing rates evoked by each part 
versus the composite. Error bars represent the 95% confidence 
intervals. Significant positive correlations are denoted by * (p < 0.05) 
and ** (p < 0.01). 
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was significantly positively correlated with the 
composite (Pearson correlation, r(67) = 0.17 p = 
0.03). During the second epoch, the only part 
significantly positively correlated with the 
composite was the one corresponding to the top half 
of the composite figure (Pearson correlation, r(67) = 
0.25 p = 0.006). For the third epoch, none of the parts 
were significantly positively correlated with the 
composite. There were significant negative 
correlations during all three epochs, but the 
interpretation of this finding is unclear. 
Even though there were no significant 
differences in mean firing rate across stimulus 
conditions we were still concerned that firing rate 
covariation may be confounding our results. To 
completely remove firing rate from the equation we 
set aside Euclidean distance in favor of a distance 
measure that was instead based on the angle between 
the population firing rate vectors (Eq. 4). Since the 
angle and magnitude of population firing rate 
vectors are independent, we could be confident that 
any findings produced by this method were not due 
to firing rate contamination.  
Figure 30. Population vector angle yields the same 
results. A, Multidimensional scaling reflects 
approximate population vector angle between stimuli. 
As in Fig. 28A the composite is closest to the external 
contour. B, Dendrogram of angular distances between 
stimuli. Compare to Fig. 28B. C, Timecourse of the 
angular distances between the composite and the 
external contour (purple) and the mean angular distance 
between the composite and the remaining parts (green). 
Compare to Fig. 29A. 
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First, we repeated the multidimensional scaling analysis (Fig. 28A) using angular distance 
instead of Euclidean distance. Our results looked remarkably similar to the original analysis (Fig. 
30A). The composite was still situated closest to the external contour. Next we constructed a 
dendrogram with these correlation-derived distances, and arrived at the same essential outcome as 
with the ED-based clustering (Fig. 28B). The representation of the composite was closer to that of 
the external contour compared to other parts (Fig. 30B).  
Finally, we wanted to determine whether the temporal precedence of the contour-like 
representation was still present when examining angular distance between population vectors. The 
temporal dynamics remained intact (Fig. 30C), compared to the previous analysis (Fig. 29A). What 
differed between the two methods is that while the Euclidean distance between the composite and 
its constituent parts rose from baseline, the angular distance actually decreased from baseline. This 
is not surprising, but it serves to reinforce the rationale behind using angular distance as a metric 
unbiased by firing rate. Using a bootstrap analysis, we determined that the angular distance 
between composite and contour was significantly less than that of the other parts for the early 
epoch (1,000 permutations, p = 0.04) and trending toward significance for late epochs (1,000 
permutations, p = 0.07). For the middle epoch, there was no significant difference in angular 
distance (1,000 permutations, p = 0.59). The early epoch effect remained significant when 
considering only the data from monkey 1 (n = 37, p = 0.05), but only trended toward significance 
for monkey 2 (n = 30, p = 0.16). In both animals the trend was always in favor of a smaller angular 
distance between the composite and the external contour. 
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4.4 DISCUSSION 
We studied the responses of IT neurons to composite shapes and all of their constituent 
parts shown in isolation.  These parts can be categorized as either natural or unnatural based on 
the Gestalt law of simplicity (Fig. 25). The natural parts are those whose overlapping contours 
were used to construct the composites in the first place, and when taken as pairs they have fewer 
corners compared to the unnatural shapes. Humans tend to regard the unnatural parts as invisible 
unless they are explicitly pointed out (Metzger, 1936).  
What we found was that as a population IT neurons no more encoded the composite like 
the natural parts than like the unnatural parts (Fig. 27A). Instead, these overlapping shapes more 
closely resembled the average of any pair of complementary parts (Fig. 27B-D). One of the 
unnatural parts did come close to the composite in neuronal activation space: the external contour. 
This effect was prominent early in the trial (Fig. 29A).  
4.4.1 Relation to Occlusion   
Previous work using overlapping shape outlines demonstrated mean firing rate suppression 
to the composites compared to the individual natural parts (Missal et al., 1999). Our results did not 
replicate this finding. Instead, we observed that mean firing rates was the same across conditions 
(Fig. 28C) and on a neuron-by-neuron basis the composite response was equal to the average of 
the responses to the parts (Fig. 27B-D).  
Our results are also at odds with a prior finding in V4 that the representation of accidental 
contours – those generated by occlusion of solid shapes – were suppressed (Bushnell et al., 2011). 
The analog of accidental contours in our study were the unnatural parts. We saw no evidence that 
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the responses to unnatural parts were suppressed compared to natural parts or composites. 
However, the comparison between accidental contours created by opaque occluders and the 
creation of unnatural parts by overalapping shape outlines are not exactly the same, so it is unclear 
whether our results truly stand in opposition.  
Instead it may be the case that opaque occluders more forcefully assert the percept of 3D 
overlap whereas line drawings are perceived as 2D intersections. However, Missal and colleagues 
also explored the effect of opaque occluders and found no significant differences between those 
conditions and overlapping shape outlines (1999), suggesting that the lack of suppression we 
observed was not due to our use of shape outlines. Neither these studies nor ours incorporated 
behavior so we can’t say for sure whether the neuronal difference reflect genuine difference in 
mental percepts.  
4.4.2 The Whole is equal to the Average of the Parts 
Our result that the whole is equal to the average of the parts is in agreement with prior 
studies involving IT neurons (Sripati and Olson, 2010a) and visual search behavior (Pramod and 
Arun, 2016a). Under these previous designs, the parts were segregated to separate poles of the 
objects, and the local features anchoring the parts to the object never changed, so it is less 
surprising that IT neurons would encode the whole as a linear combination of the parts in this 
context.  
One exception to this rule of part summation was the presence of symmetry, which 
increased the perceived dissimilarity between objects (Pramod and Arun, 2016a). Symmetry has 
long been a fixture of the Gestalt theories of vision, and it ties into the law of simplicity by the 
virtue that symmetric objects are simpler than their asymmetric counterparts so they attain 
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configural superiority such that they “pop out” of visual arrays (Pomerantz et al., 1977). Another 
interesting parallel between this behavioral work and the present experiment is that when the 
targets of visual search were varied in their natural parts – in this case defined as the top and bottom 
halves of a wasp-waisted figure – there was a slight advantage over when the unnatural parts – 
defined as the parts separated by a vertical bisection – were varied across search targets (Pramod 
and Arun, 2016a). Because of this behavioral evidence that the Gestalt of objects affects their 
mental representation, it was surprising that there were no nonlinearities present in our results.  
Using the kind of 2D line drawings that we employed, it has been demonstrated that 
humans more readily perceive natural compared to unnatural parts (Mens and Leeuwenberg, 
1988). Because our results stand in opposition to this behavior, we can postulate three 
explanations. First, it may be the case that neuronal segregation of natural from unnatural parts 
may require conscious effort that our monkeys were not inspired to put forth. Second, parsing 
composites into natural parts may be unique tendency of humans, perhaps as a result of prior 
history with interpreting abstract shapes. Third, the breakdown of composites into natural versus 
unnatural parts may occur somewhere outside of IT cortex. While IT activity correlates with 
spontaneous perceptual oscillations of a bistable image (Sheinberg and Logothetis, 1997), task 
instructions not seem to modulate IT responses evoked by single objects (Vogels et al., 1995).  The 
supposition that monkeys don’t perceptually parse composites into their natural parts remain 
plausible because no one has explicitly tested this in monkeys behaviorally. While functional 
imaging demonstrates activation in human LOC when displays possess the Gestalt rule of good 
continuation (Kuai et al., 2016), monkey IT is not a perfect analog. Therefore, we cannot conclude 
from our negative finding that the law of simplicity is not reflected elsewhere in the primate brain.  
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4.4.3 Dissociating External Contour from Internal Parts 
While we did not find evidence for natural part preference, we did observe that one part 
stood above the rest. Of all the parts we tested, the external contour came closest to capturing the 
representation of the composite (Fig. 29A). This is similar to the finding that IT neurons encode 
image dissimilarity according to the global footprint of objects (Sripati and Olson, 2010b). 
Many attempts have been made in the past to describe the high level neuronal 
representation of shapes in terms of the external contour of objects. So-called boundary-based 
models first convert an object into a silhouette, discarding internal detail. Four boundary-based 
models were compared against human psychophysics during a visual search task and found to be 
wholly inadequate to describe the perception of shape dissimilarity (Pramod and Arun, 2016b). 
One of these models, Fourier descriptor filters was also tested against shape representations in IT 
and found to be a poor fit in that system as well (Albright and Gross, 1990).  
What we observed is that especially early in the trial (Fig. 29), the composite was encoded 
more like the external contour than any other part. Later in the trial the parts – in particular the part 
created from the top half of the composite – became more equally represented. We take this as 
evidence for the global advantage effect, in which global shape is perceived before local details 
(Navon, 1977), which has previously been demonstrated in IT with Navon-style hierarchical 
stimuli (Sripati and Olson, 2009). 
4.4.4 Likelihood versus Simplicity 
Finally, we return to an age-old debate. Are visual stimuli interpreted in the simplest way 
possible (Wertheimer, 1923), or as the most likely interpretation (Helmholtz, 1925)? Our results 
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are more consistent with the latter theory. Each part was equally likely to appear under our 
experimental design. The simplicity of parts conferred no bias on neuronal responses. Composites 
were instead encoded as a linear combination of their constituent parts.  
By contrast, prior studies have shown that IT neurons robustly encode familiarity 
(Anderson et al., 2008; Freedman et al., 2005; Li et al., 1993; Mruczek and Sheinberg, 2005). 
Therefore, a neuronal mechanism exists in inferotemporal cortex whereby the input could be 
interpreted based on its likelihood, which is in turn derived from past experience. This is the idea 
behind hierarchical Bayesian models of visual cortex (Lee and Mumford, 2003). Since our 
experiment did not vary the likelihood that any part would appear we cannot say that our results 
provide evidence for the likelihood model, only that our results do not support its rival, the 
simplicity model.  
4.4.5 Conclusions 
Ultimately what we conclude from these results is that inferotemporal cortex does not abide 
by the Gestalt law of simplicity when encoding two-dimensional overlapping shapes. Such 
composites were merely represented as the average of any pair of constituent parts, regardless of 
how complex or how unnatural they were. Furthermore, the whole was represented especially well 
by the external contour alone, particularly in the first 70ms of the visual burst. We take this as 
additional evidence that global form is encoded before local features and that this phenomenon 
occurs in inferotemporal cortex.  
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5.0  GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The purpose of the experiments described in this dissertation was to investigate the 
neuronal mechanisms that contribute to object representation. The experiment presented in chapter 
2 investigated whether macaque monkeys experience the phenomenon of crowding. We 
demonstrated that, like humans, macaque monkeys have greater trouble discriminating peripheral 
letters when other letters are nearby, and that the interference zone was dependent solely on 
eccentricity. These are the hallmarks of crowding, and they provide a new behavioral paradigm 
for investigating this phenomenon at the neuronal level, which has never before been done. The 
experiments presented in chapter 3 did just that. We investigated the effects of crowding on visual 
object representations in inferotemporal cortex. What we found was that crowding both 
quantitatively weakens the neuronal selectivity between crowded objects and qualitatively alters 
the neuronal code. In chapter 4 we continued the theme of investigating how parts of objects 
interact, this time in the context of overlapping shapes that create new parts. What we found is that 
rather than following Gestalt principle of simplicity, inferotemporal cortex neurons encoded 
composite stimuli as the average of any complete set of their constituent parts. The significance of 
our findings was discussed at a more technical level at the end of the previous chapters. Here, we 
provide a more general overview of the relevance of our findings to the field of visual neuroscience 
at large.  
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5.1 A MONKEY MODEL OF VISUAL CROWDING 
Much of what we think we know about the human nervous system comes from the study 
of nonhuman animals. The emphasis on animal models in understandable given the limitations of 
experimental tools available for use in humans, particularly when it comes to understanding 
mechanisms at or below the level of single neurons. For many cognitive and behavioral 
neuroscientists, the animal of choice has been the macaque monkey (Macaca mulatta). The role of 
macaques as proxies for humans is especially apparent in vision research. When textbooks turn 
from human visual function to its neuronal basis, they switch from human to macaque studies so 
casually that one could easily lose sight of the fact that these species are not neurologically 
equivalent. 
Old World monkeys, the group to which macaques belong, diverged from apes and humans 
approximately 25–30 million years ago (Wilkinson et al., 2010). When considering the 
evolutionary relationship between any pair of species, it is important to keep in mind that 
evolutionary changes can and do occur along both branches emanating from the most recent 
common ancestor. Thus, it is not a given that homologous structures and functions are conserved. 
 While it has been asserted that monkeys see what humans see (Kaas, 1992), when the two 
species were tested in side-by-side psychophysical tasks, researchers found “important, nontrivial 
differences between the data for monkeys and humans” (Harwerth and E. L. Smith, 1985). 
Whereas humans showed the greatest sensitivity to light in the red part of the spectrum and the 
lowest sensitivity to blue, macaques followed the opposite trend, which the researchers attribute 
to pre-retinal light loss due to higher macular pigment in humans (Harwerth and E. L. Smith, 
1985). Humans also possess superior acuity compared to macaques, as measured by orientation 
discrimination (Vazquez et al., 2000), Vernier acuity (Kiorpes et al., 1993), or the peak spatial 
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frequency of luminance contrast sensitivity (Harwerth and E. L. Smith, 1985). Harwerth and Smith 
chalked this acuity difference up to differences in the size of the eye. Additionally, humans had 
larger and more profoundly inhibitory “perceptive fields” – the regions of visual space over which 
an annulus interferes with the detection of a spot of light within in (Spillmann et al., 1987) – which 
may have implications for attention allocation (Kaas and Collins, 2003). This result is also relevant 
to the present study, which is concerned with crowding.  
 With the ultimate goal of understanding the neuronal mechanisms underlying crowding we 
did not want to assume that monkeys exhibit crowding or that a task suitable for monkey 
neurophysiology would produce crowding. What we observed was that macaque monkeys do 
exhibit the essential hallmarks of crowding.  
At the most basic level, nearby flankers impeded the discrimination of peripheral targets, 
and as the spacing between targets and flankers increased performance improved. Most 
importantly, the critical spacing over which flankers interfered with target recognition scaled with 
eccentricity, independent of target/flanker size. Human behavior under identical task conditions 
reflected these same overall patterns, although critical spacings were on average a little smaller in 
humans. This finding establishes a benchmark for the extent and spread of crowding in a nonhuman 
primate that can be invoked for future neurophysiological investigations. Our results also support 
the use of the macaque monkey as a relevant model organism for future studies of crowding. 
Crowding researchers can now avail themselves of the powerful invasive tools not available for 
human studies. 
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5.2 CROWDING AND OBJECT REPRESENTATION  
At the core of most vision research is implicitly or explicitly a hierarchical, feedforward 
model, in which visual processing proceeds from the analysis of basic features to more and more 
complex ones (Fukushima, 1980; Guclu and van Gerven, 2015; Riesenhuber and Poggio, 1999; 
Serre et al., 2007). Neurons in the primary visual cortex V1 act as filters to detect the lines and 
edges of visual images (Hubel and Wiesel, 1959). Neurons in V2 pool information from V1 
neurons to encode more complex features, such as contours (Hegde and Van Essen, 2000) or 
texture (Freeman et al., 2013). This coding principle of filtering and pooling proceeds along the 
visual hierarchy to V4 and ultimately IT. The beauty and main goal of these models is to replace 
subjective terms, such as the Gestalt laws, by truly mechanistic theory, but there’s an inherent 
danger that the theory will be over-simplified. 
Let’s consider two important characteristics of this hierarchical feedforward theoretical 
framework. First, if information is lost at the early stages, it is irretrievably lost, since processing 
at each level is fully determined by convergent inputs from the previous level. Second, receptive 
field size increases along the visual hierarchy because integration over progressively larger parts 
of the visual scene is necessary for representing faces and objects, as IT does. Although these 
hierarchical feedforward models don’t generally account for differences between foveal and 
peripheral vision, we know empirically that receptive fields also get larger as a function of 
eccentricity (Gattass et al., 1981; 1988).  
So, what does any of this have to do with crowding? Several researchers have pointed to 
large peripheral receptive fields as the fundamental neuronal mechanism underlying crowding 
(Freeman and E. P. Simoncelli, 2011; Rosenholtz, 2012). By this line of reasoning, peripheral 
object recognition becomes difficult when objects are embedded in clutter because irrelevant 
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elements comingle with relevant ones when they all fall within the same receptive field. Past 
behavioral experiments, as well as the results presented in chapter 3, highlight the flaws of this 
account of crowding, and by extension, the purely hierarchical feedforward model of object 
recognition in general. 
In particular, crowding is not an inevitable bottleneck, as was once thought (Levi, 2008). 
Adding more flankers (Banks et al., 1979), planning a saccadic eye movement (Harrison et al., 
2013), and arranging flankers such that they exhibit grouping (Livne, 2010) can release peripheral 
stimuli from crowding. In our own research, we observed that information apparently lost in the 
feedforward sweep may not be entirely irretrievable under crowding. When attention was deployed 
to crowded targets, neuronal selectivity improved over time (Fig. 15, 16), which should not have 
occurred if target information was actually lost. Furthermore, we observed qualitative changes in 
the neuronal preferences for targets (Fig. 17, 18), main effects (Fig. 20A,B), and interaction effects 
(Fig. 20C,D) as a function of the spacing between peripheral stimuli. This finding doesn’t follow 
from a feedforward, hierarchical model that pools information across receptive fields. Therefore, 
these models fail to explain crowding and thus they cannot explain object recognition in general.  
Overall, crowding offers a powerful tool for breaking the normal processes of object 
recognition, and in turn highlighting ways in which models of the brain come up short. By probing 
crowding at the level of single neurons we were able to uncover a novel neuronal behavior – 
swapping stimulus preferences –  which future models of vision should be able to replicate.  
Besides crowding, hierarchical feedforward models of vision also fail to account for the 
primacy of the whole – seeing the forest before the trees – as well as the laws of vision put forth 
by the Gestalt school of psychology. While the Gestalt system was light on mechanistic theory, 
the phenomena they sought to explain do not go away. In the next section, we investigate how the 
  122 
Gestalt law of simplicity relates to the encoding of parts and wholes by inferotemporal cortex 
neurons. 
5.3 THE WHOLE EQUALS THE AVERAGE OF THE PARTS 
Since it was first committed to the page a century ago, researchers have attempted to 
operationalize the fuzzy Gestalt notion that the whole is not simply the sum of its constituent parts. 
The goal of operationalization was to create quantitative and falsifiable hypotheses, and ultimately 
to develop a theoretical framework that captures the perceptual phenomena that inspired the 
Gestaltists in the first place.  
Perhaps the most famous attempt at translating Gestalt psychology into a quantitative 
model came in the form of structural information theory (SIT), which is based on Shannon’s 
information theory (1948). Rather than quantifying information by the probability of occurrence – 
as Shannon did – SIT quantifies the information load of a visual stimulus by the number of 
parameters needed to specify its content. For instance, two parallel curves in an object, let’s call 
them c, could be represented as 2c, whereas two different curves, would have to be represented 
with their own parameters, say d and e. When objects can be represented according to multiple 
coding schemes – such as when occlusion introduces accidental contours – SIT offers a mechanism 
to quantify the information load of each potential representation. Following the Gestaltist elevation 
of simplicity as the core principal of visual representation, proponents of SIT postulated that 
stimuli are perceptually organized according to the simplest – i.e., lowest information load – 
representation possible (Simon, 1972).  
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We sought to test this hypothesis by constructing composite stimuli that could be 
decomposed in several ways, with varying degrees of complexity. What we observed was that 
composite stimuli were not preferentially represented as a combination of the simplest possible set 
of parts (Fig. 27A). Rather, the composite was encoded as the average of any complete set of parts 
(Fig. 27B-D). This finding is in line with the idea that even though hidden figures tend not to rise 
to the level of conscious awareness they are still present in the subconscious (Mens and 
Leeuwenberg, 1988). Despite the lack of evidence for SIT, we did find support for another 
operationalization of holistic processing: primacy of the whole (Fig. 29A, 30C). 
Primacy of the whole – the idea that stimuli are processed holistically before their local 
features are perceived – has been previously demonstrated both behaviorally (Navon, 1977) and 
at the level of single neurons (Sripati and Olson, 2009). What these results imply is that visual 
processing progresses hierarchically down a decision tree, with global form at the top and local 
features in the branches. This is like the predominant hierarchical, feedforward models of the visual 
system, except played out in reverse (Hochstein and Ahissar, 2002).  
Our findings reinforced the notion of primacy of the whole in the sense that the external 
contour of a composite stimulus was represented first, before the other parts. However, the more 
precise hierarchical conceptualization of this theory found less support in our data. We constructed 
hierarchical trees depicting the relationships between the various parts and the composite (Fig. 
28B). While the external contour continued to cluster with the composite in this analysis, and the 
parts formed a secondary cluster, it was the curvy part of the set – depicted as a circle in Fig. 28B 
– that stood atop the hierarchy, not the external contour or the composite. Yet again, this 
operationalization of Gestalt principles was not fully borne out in the neuronal data. 
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While our simple experiment with composite shapes and various decompositions is not 
sufficient to reject Gestalt theory outright, it does cast doubt on the notion that Gestalt laws are 
innately present in the visual system. It could be that holistic neuronal representations in the visual 
system only come with practice (Baker et al., 2002). Or perhaps monkeys lack the level of holistic 
perception that humans possess (Bruce, 1982), such that to the nonhuman primate brain the whole 
really is simply a combination of its parts (Sripati and Olson, 2010a). Since our experiment lacked 
behavior, we cannot make any strong claims about how our animals perceived the compound 
stimuli. 
Ultimately, the behavioral evidence for Gestalt laws is robust and real (Elder and Zucker, 
1994; Pomerantz et al., 1977; Pomerantz and Portillo, 2011; Sekuler and Palmer, 1992). 
Introspectively, these rules of perception seem effortless, almost inescapable (Metzger, 1936). 
Thus, despite the absence of mechanistic explanations, we should not reject the Gestaltists’ 
intuitions. They protect us from falling back on the reductionist view that the representation of 
integrated, coherent forms can be understood by studying local processing alone. 
5.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The work described in this dissertation has resulted in three contributions to our 
understanding of the neuronal mechanisms of object recognition. The first discovery is that 
macaque monkeys exhibit the behavioral hallmarks of visual crowding. This is the first 
demonstration of this phenomenon in a non-human primate and it establishes a new experimental 
paradigm for future investigation of the elusive neuronal mechanisms underlying crowding. The 
second discovery is that crowding both quantitatively weakens and qualitatively changes the 
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neuronal code in inferotemporal cortex. This finding rules out an explanation of crowding based 
solely on signal averaging. The third discovery is that neurons in inferotemporal cortex do not 
follow the Gestalt law of simplicity. Instead, they encode composite shapes as the average of any 
set of its constituent parts, not just those that appear “natural” or “simple” (i.e., possess the fewest 
corners). Taken together, these results provide novel insights into how the representation of object 
parts interfere and cohere in inferotemporal cortex.  
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